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ABSTRACT 
Traditional financial theory which is based on the Modigliani-Miller indifference 
paradigm, suggests that a firm's financial policies, of which risk management is one 
component, are irrelevant. However, this conclusion is seemingly contradicted by the 
observation of widespread use of derivatives by companies, particularly for hedging 
purposes. 
This apparent conflict is receiving attention from international financial 
researchers. A number of hypothesis have been proposed to explain corporate risk 
management. To evaluate the strength of these theories, this paper begins with a 
formalised process of identifying the assumptions underlying the hypotheses. The 
theories are classified according to which assumptions are relaxed. 
A limited number of international empirical studies have been performed to 
date. The results have been varied; four of the important studies are discussed. 
For the first time, an empirical investigation into the determinants of corporate 
risk management in South Africa is conducted. The most significant findings are that 
larger firms are more inclined to undertake risk management, and the likelihood of a 










T Dunley-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk Afanagement 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
To my parents; Dr Jane Hobson, my supervisor; my friends, in all your varied 
professions, particularly my brother, Niccy and Mark; and all in the Department of 











T. Dun/ey-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk Jlanagement iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABST"RACT ............................................................................................................. 11 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................... 111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................... IV 
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................. VIII 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
A OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................... l 
B. THEPROBLEM ................................................................................................ 3 
C. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH ........................................................ 3 
D. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH ............................................................. .4 
E. PLAN OF THE PAPER ..................................................................................... 5 
II. RISK MANAGEMENT ...................................................................................... 6 
A RISK. ................................................................................................................. 6 
A.1. Evolution of the concept of exposure ........................................................... 8 
A. 2. Evolution of the concept of manageable risk .............................................. 10 
B. RISK MANAGEMENT ................................................................................... 12 
B. J. The objective of risk management.. ............................................................ 12 
B. 2. The activities of risk management .............................................................. 13 
B. 3. Hedging and the role of forecasting ........................................................... 14 
B. 4. The tools of risk management .................................................................... 16 
B. 5. The effect of risk management ................................................................... 18 
B. 6. Conclusion ............................................................................................... . 18 
C. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RISK MANAGEMENT THEORY AND 
PRACTICE .......................................................................................................... 19 
C. J. Risk management in theory ........................................................................ 19 










T Dun/ey-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk :\Janagement v 
(~. 3. Conclusion ................................................................................................ 2 ../ 
ID. THE FRAMEW 0 RK ..........................................•............................................ 25 
A OVERVIEW .................................................................................................... 25 
B. THE ASSUMPTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS .................................... 28 
C. BEHAVIOUR UNDER THE ASSUMPTIONS ............................................... 31 
D. RELAXING THE ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................ 31 
E. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 34 
IV. EMPI.RICAL STUDIES ................................................................................... 35 
A NANCE, SMITH, AND SMITHSON (1993) ................................................... 35 
B. GECZY, MINTON, AND SCHRAND (1996) .................................................. 37 
C. BERK.MAN AND BRADBURY (1996) ........................................................... 38 
D. TUFANO (1996B) ........................................................................................... 38 
E. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 39 
V. IMPERFECT MARKETS ................................................................................. 41 
A CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS ....................................................... .41 
A.I. Froot, Scharfstein And Stein (1993) ........................................................... 41 
A. 2. Size theory ................................................................................................. 47 
B. LEGAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS ........................................................... .47 
C. LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTIONS ......................................................... 48 
C. J. Signalling Managerial Skill ....................................................................... 48 
D. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ......................... 48 
VI. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES ................................................................ 49 
A SIGNALLING MANAGERIAL SKILL: BREEDEN AND VISWANATHAN 
(1996) AND DEMARZO AND DUFFIE (1995) ................................................... 49 
A.I. DeMarzo and Duffie's model.. ................................................................... 50 
B. PROPRIETARY INFORMATION HELD BY FIRMS: DEMARZO AND 
DUFFIE (1991) .................................................................................................... 51 
B. 2. Empirical findings ..................................................................................... 51 
C. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH. ......................... 52 










T Dunley-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk J,fanagement vi 
A. REDUCING EXPECTED TAXES .................................................................. 53 
A.I. The model. ................................................................................................. 53 
A.2. Example illustrating how risk management can add value ......................... 54 
A. 3. Empirical findings ..................................................................................... 5 7 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FORFURTHERRESEARCH ....................... 58 
VIII. PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS ............................................................. 60 
A. SHAREHOLDER- MANAGER CONFLICT .................................................. 61 
A. I. Studies of firms' objectives ........................................................................ 61 
A. 2 Theories to explain risk management when principal-agent problems exists63 
B. SHAREHOLDER-DEBTHOLDER CONFLICT ............................................ 65 
B. I. The 'distortion of investment' problem ...................................................... 65 
B. 2. The underinvestment problem .................................................................... 67 
B. 3. Reduction of borrowing costs ..................................................................... 68 
B. 4. Reduction of expected costs of financial distress: Smith and Stultz (I 985). 69 
B. 5. Size Implications ....................................................................................... 71 
B. 6. Empirical findings ..................................................................................... 71 
C. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH. ......................... 73 
IX. RISK A VERSE PLAYERS .............................................................................. 75 
A. RISK A VERSE MANAGERS ......................................................................... 75 
A. I. Lifetime utility maximisation: Stultz (1984) ............................................... 75 
A.2. Smith and Stultz (1985) .............................................................................. 77 
A. 3. Empirical findings ..................................................................................... 78 
A. 4. Criticism .................................................................................................... 80 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH. ......................... 81 
X. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORA TE 
RISK MANAGEMENT USING SOUTH AFRICAN DATA ..••••.•...•........••........• 83 
A. CONSTRUCTION OF THE SAMPLE ............................................................ 83 
B. DEPENDANTVARIABLE ............................................................................. 85 
B. J. Advantage of the risk management variable ............................................... 87 










T. Dun/ey-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk Afanagement vii 
C. INDEPENDANT VARIABLES ...................................................................... 89 
C.1. Shareholder - Debtholder Conflict ............................................................. 89 
C. 2. Capital Market Imperfections .................................................................... 91 
C. 3. Risk A version of Managers ........................................................................ 94 
D. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS ............................................................................. 94 
E. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 96 
E.1. Logit Analysis ............................................................................................ 97 
XI. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORA TE 
RISK MANGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICAN FIRMS ...................................... 101 
A UNIVARIATE NON-PARAMETRIC RESULTS .......................................... 101 
B. RE SUL TS OF THE LOG IT ANALYSIS ....................................................... 107 
C. COMPARISON WITH INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND AREAS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH ....................................................................................... 110 
xm. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 112 
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................... 116 
APPENDIX 1. DATA SOURCE ........................................................................ 116 
A. DEPENDANT VARIABLE .......................................................................... 116 
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES .................................................................... 116 
APPENDIX 2. DATA. ........................................................................................ 119 










T Dun/ey-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk .\Ianagement viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
VI. 1. Comparison of empirical analyses of rationales for corporate risk 
management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
VIII. I. The importance of financial objectives....................................... . 62 
VIII.2. Outcomes of safe project I....................................................... 66 
VIII.3. Outcomes of risky project II................................................... . 66 
VIII.4. Outcomes of project III....................................................... . . . 67 
VIII.5. Outcomes of project IV....................................................... . . . 68 
XI. l. Descriptive Statistics of independent variables... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 
XI.2. Univariate non-parametric test................................................... . 103 
XI. 3. Pearson correlation matrix for independent variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 










T. Dunley-Owen The Determinants o.fCorporate Risk Management 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
Historically, the focus of academic literature concerning risk management has 
been on the practicalities and the mechanics of the subject (the 'how' question). The 
risks to be managed are identified and the appropriate type and quantity of financial 
instrument is selected. There appears to be a growing awareness that a more important 
question should be addressed prior to the above. Should risks be managed at all, and if 
so, by whom and to what extent (the 'why' question). Although in its infancy, the body 
of academic financial risk management literature with this orientation is growing 
rapidly and has become the research focus of many eminent financial academics, as 
evidenced by the following: 
It would seem that every firm exposed to increased risk should hedge. Of 
course, matters are far more complicated than they first appear. Even with the 
increase in risk. not all firms use risk management products to reduce risk by 
hedging . ... we want to focus on the primary question: Why should a company 
hedge its financial price risk? Or. to rephrase the question, which firms have 
the best reason for hedging? (Smith: 1990: 19-3) 
Financial hedging or 'risk management'. is an aspect of corporate 
financial policy that has received relatively little attention ... Given the 
prevalence and importance of this type of activity, the underlying economic 
rationale for, and implications of corporate hedging, are important questions 
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Academics know remarkably little about corporate risk management 
practices, even though almost three-fourths of corporations have adopted at 
least some .financial engineering techniques to control their exposures to 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices. (Tufano: 1996b: 
1097) 
An overview of the literature highlights two fundamental problems: 
• a logically consistent and widely applicable theoretical rationale for risk 
management that co-ordinates the strategies of investors and firms has not been 
accepted by academics; and 
• the predictions of existing financial theory, notably the Modigliani -Miller 
indifference theorem, suggests that corporate risk management is irrelevant. 
However, there is widespread use of risk management products by firms. This 
suggests that financial theory is not currently applicable in the real world. 
The majority of current literature attempts, explicitly or implicitly, to address 
these concerns offering piecemeal theoretical justifications for corporate risk 
management. There is no universally accepted theory and the collection of papers 
dealing with this subject has become replete with competing hypotheses, a number of 
which are simplistic, unrealistic and duplicated. The value of any hypothesis can only 
be determined by its relevance; its applicability to reality as decided by empirical 
observations. However, there is a paucity of empirical work in this area. Several 
recently published international studies have attempted to test empirically whether the 
firms' behaviour is consistent with the predictions of financial theory. To date there has 
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B. THE PROBLEM 
There appears to be a mismatch between the quantity and form of risk 
management seen in practice and that which is postulated by financial theory. No 
comprehensive theoretical framework that legitimises corporate risk management 
programmes or that co-ordinates the risk management strategies of investors and firms, 
exists. There is a growing volume of studies which attempt to address these concerns. 
However, the relative infancy of the subject and enormous interest therein has resulted 
in numerous hypotheses which are difficult to evaluate and contextualise. Although a 
few international empirical research papers have been published recently, no similar 
South African analyses have been undertaken. 
C. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
This research proposes to: 
• investigate the implicit assumption underlying most of the literature that there is a 
conflict between corporate risk management practices in theory and reality; 
• critically evaluate existing academic theories that suggest a paradigm for corporate 
risk management; 
• compare and evaluate the results of four international empirical investigations; 
• following the international research, perform an empirical investigation utilising a 
South African data set; and 
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D. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The significance of this research must be considered from two perspectives: the 
importance of the subject matter and the contribution which this paper makes to the 
body of knowledge. Investigating the rationale for hedging which is undertaken by a 
company is currently attracting attention from eminent financial academics. The 
importance thereof lies in the attempt to model fundamental behaviour observed in the 
real world and to form a paradigm which can be used to guide corporate risk 
management practices. South African research in this field is minimal. 1 The growing 
interest and enthusiasm in this field has produced a voluminous number of papers 
proposing different reasons for corporate risk management. The relative worth of a 
number of these theories has not been assessed. It is important to develop a logical 
structure within which the work to date can be evaluated. 
This paper will develop a framework which facilitates a clearer understanding 
of the existing literature. The manner in which the framework is constructed allows for 
an objective evaluation of the hypotheses through logical classification and overt 
enunciation of all underlying assumptions. Additionally, results of significant 
international empirical research will be presented and synthesised such that the global 
relevance of theories can be investigated. For the first time, an empirical investigation 
into rationales for corporate risk management utilising South African data will be 
conducted and the results examined. Areas with potential for future research, both 
theoretical and empirical, are identified. 
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E. PLAN OF THE PAPER 
This research can be broken into three primary divisions. The first, which 
comprises the following two sections, is introductory. Section II clarifies and defines 
terms and concepts utilised in this research. Section III presents a framework for the 
evaluation of existing theories and considers the implications thereof in general terms. 
The second division includes Section IV to Section IX. These examine the theories that 
are implied by inefficiencies introduced through the relaxing of critical assumptions. 
The first section discusses the international empirical studies in general terms. 
Thereafter, in each section, the various hypotheses are evaluated and the results of the 
international empirical studies are presented. The remainder of the paper focuses on 
the South African empirical research undertaken. Section X sets out the methodology 
of the study. The sample design and selection and the choice of independent and 
dependant variables is discussed. The various statistical tools utilised are briefly 
explained. Section XI contains the results of the empirical study. Areas for future 
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II. RISK MANAGEMENT 
This section will clarify and define terms and concepts to be utilised in this 
research. 
A. RISK1 
The academic concept of risk differs from a layperson' s perception thereof The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines risk as: 'hazard, chance of bad consequences, loss, 
etc.'. This focuses exclusively on the downside, 'negative' risk of changes relative to 
today's values, while the academic definition of risk is a 'measure of the likelihood and 
magnitude of unanticipated changes' (Oxelheim and Wihlborg: 1987: 5). This 
encapsulates unexpected movements in either direction (positive or negative): it is 
concerned with the spread of values around the expected value and can thus be 
calibrated using the standard deviation or variance of a probability distribution. 
Variance (r) = the expected value of (r - r *) 
= E [ (r- r*)] 
) 
=cf, 
Standard deviation = a, 
1There is a theoretical distinction between risk and uncertainty. Risk refers to the unique results for a 
given decision which can be assigned objective probabilities. Uncertainty implies that it is not entirely 
possible to identify outcomes or to assign probabilities. Nevertheless. subjective probabilities can often 
be assigned to the predicted outcomes and thus a situation involving uncertainty is evaluated as a risky 
situation. This blurs the distinction between the two concepts in practice. This distinction is not 
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where: 
r =actual return 
r* = expected return (sum o.f probability weighted possible returns) 
The shareholder views risk in relation to their portfolio of assets. The portfolio 
variance is the average covariance among all the constituents of the portfolio. Thus the 
marginal risk of asset j is the relative increase in the portfolio variance that 
accompanies a marginal increase in the proportional of asset j in the portfolio. 
Therefore, the risk relating to a particular asset in a portfolio is evaluated not on the 
asset's individual variance but rather on the effect it has on portfolio variance. 
The expected return on the porifolio is: 
where: 
r*p = E [rp j =expected return on the porifolio 
r*; = E [r,J =expected return on the ith asset 
r1 = return on the ith asset in the porifolio 
8; = value weighted proportion of the porifolio held in the ith 
asset with I!',=1 8, = 1 
N = number of assets in the porifolio 
The variance of the return on the porifolio (or the porifolio risk) is: 
_2 rN w 
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where: 
dP =variance of the return on the risky portfolio 
a; = standard deviation of the return on the ith asset 
Pu = correlation between the returns on the ith and jth assets 
A.1. Evolution of the concept of exposure 
The exposures that have concerned corporate treasurers have changed over the 
decades. 2 Initially the risks that were managed were those that had a direct impact on 
the reported accounting earnings of a corporation. The simplest exposure to manage is 
transaction exposure: the exposure associated with specific and identifiable cash 
flows. It arises from macroeconomic fluctuations which affect committed cash flows; 
for example~ interest and capital payments on loans; repatriation of profits; receivables; 
and payables. This exposure creates uncertainty as to cash profits. Translation 
exposure is also accounting based, specifically a balance sheet exposure. It results 
from the translation of foreign assets and liabilities into a company's domestic currency 
for financial statement purposes. This exposure has no effect on cash flow and 
'(h)edging translation exposure is, therefore, almost entirely a question of image' 
( Oxelheim and Wihlborg: 198 7: 178). However, overall corporate performance in the 
long run is exposed to more than merely transaction and translation exposures. 
In the early 1970's the tools available to manage risk became more 
sophisticated. In addition, methodologies which facilitated the aggregation and netting 
off of risk positions were developed. Thus the concept of competitive or economic 
exposure was devised. Although authors employ different terminology and definitions, 
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the notion of competitive or economic risk is widely accepted in the literature. 3 This 
risk is concerned with the direct and indirect impact on the earnings of the firm in 
future periods. Effects of transaction and translation exposures are examples of the 
direct impact on earnings. The indirect impact can result from a number of competitive 
exposures. These include adjustments in a competitor's behaviour that are attributable 
to changes in macroeconomic variables; namely, interest rates, currency prices or 
commodity prices. A further exposure arises from competition for market share with 
companies whose cash flows are denominated in a different currency. 
Since the blurring of the distinction between commercial insurance and financial 
derivatives, a new science of operational risk management is receiving attention in the 
literature. See for example Corporate Finance Risk Management and Derivatives 
Yearbook (1996), Brady (1996), and Parsley (1996). The generic definition of 
operational risk is any risk that ultimately results in operational losses caused by the 
volatility of earnings that is not market or credit related. Examples include risk of loss 
from events related to technology and infrastructure failures, business interruptions, 
staff related problems, the dramatic changing of client relationships, and external 
events such as regulatory changes (Parsley: 1996). The evolution of the concept of 
exposure was aided by a number of spectacular losses resulting from the misuse of 
derivative instruments to manage accounting based risks. 
The redefinition and expansion of the concept of exposure has resulted in a 
completely new way of viewing the risk a firm faces. Instead of merely focusing on 
changes in accounting earnings, both indirect and direct changes in economic earnings 
are now considered. Academics and practitioners have realised that it is not merely the 
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accounting earnings of the company that are at risk from macroeconomic changes, but 
the entire fabric of the company 4 
A.2. Evolution of the concept of manageable risk 
Modem portfolio theory, notably the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
arbitrage pncmg theory (APT) and the underlying theoretical support therefor, 
suggests that companies should not manage non-systematic risk as it can be managed 
more efficiently by individual investors through diversification. Thus the premiums that 
investors demand for incurring greater risks are comprised only of systematic risk. 
CAPM identifies the non-diversifiable risk using a 'beta' measure: generally, the 
sensitivity of a firm's share price to the market. Systematic risk according to APT is 
the sensitivity of market prices to a number of common economic factors. According 
to modem portfolio theory, investors are concerned not with the total variability of the 
firm's cash flows (total risk which incorporates both systematic and diversifiable risk) 
but only with the co-variability of those flows with the performance of the economy as 
a whole (systematic risk). The non-systematic risk can effectively be ignored as it can 
be costlessly eliminated by the investor through diversification. The systematic risk 
faced by companies is immutable as it is faced by all the companies in the market. 
Firms are therefore situated along the securities market line and the investor chooses 
the required level of returns according to the amount of risk they are prepared to incur. 
The risk return trade-off is fixed. Any firm not situated along the securities market line, 
4 Case studies which are frequently cited in the literature include Kodak in Dickens ( 1988); 
Caterpillar and Komatsu in Froot ( 1994) and Heston and Grieff ( 1990); Lufthansa in Ambolia ( 1996) 
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whose risk return profile is not in line with the market, is mispriced. This unstable 
situation will revert to equilibrium in an efficient market. 
This view has been changing in recent years. There are two readily identifiable 
reasons for this. Firstly, risk management products which specifically address 
systematic risks are freely available: futures, forwards, options and swaps used to 
manage exchange rate, interest rate, and commodity price changes are ubiquitous. 
Even the more fundamental market risks are being addressed by instruments such as 
inflation and 'Act of God' derivatives listed on the Chicago Board of Trade. 
Systematic risk can be and is widely managed. 
The second argument is comprehensively covered in Shapiro and Titman 
( 1986). They claim that there has been an almost exclusive focus on the effect of risk 
on the investor's required rate of return because of the encompassing influence of 
modern portfolio theory in recent years. Little attention has been paid to the effect on 
the expected future cash flows of a company. The value of a firm is dependant on both 
the current and the future cash flows. The majority of financial texts hold that the 
objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth5. One of the most common 
proxies for shareholder wealth is the present value of the expected future cash flows, 
where the discount rate used is the investor's required rate of return as determined by 
the CAPM or APT type models. These models, as pointed out above, assume that non-
systematic risk can be costlessly eliminated by investors and is thus irrelevant in the 
determination of the discount rate. The focus on the discount rate, as determined by 
modern portfolio theory, in the determination of the value of the firm effectively 
ignores the fact that diversifiable risk also has an impact thereon. This impact is 
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the discount rate (the denominator). Thus if the firm is able to reduce total risk by 
managing the diversifiable risk, the value of the firm will be increased. 
In this research no distinction between systematic and diversifiable risk will be 
drawn. Risk refers to the total likelihood and magnitude of changes in the value of the 
firm due to changes in macroeconomic variables. 
B. RISK MANAGEMENT 
B.l. The objective of risk management 
All financial activities, including risk management, are directed towards 
achieving the objective of the firm. The most commonly accepted goal of a company is 
to maximise shareholder value or shareholder wealth6 . As shareholder wealth is not 
objectively measurable, representative values have to be employed. The two most 
widely used proxies are the present value of future expected cash flows and the share 
pnce. 
The approach followed by Oxelheim and Wihlborg (1987) is that shareholder 




E [ V;J = expected value of firm j 
NCF;.t = net cash flows of firm j in time period t 
= discount rate o.f firm j 
5 See section 11.B. l. 










T Dunley-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk Jfanagement 13 
The objective of the company under this scenario is the maximisation of the expected 
present value of future net cash flows, i.e. the maximisation of E [ Vj ]. The market 
value of the existing shareholders' ordinary shares proxies shareholder wealth. In 
perfectly efficient capital markets the effects of all financial decisions are 
instantaneously incorporated into the share price. The share price therefore 
encapsulates all future cash flows. Pike and Neal (1996: 10) explicitly state that '(i)n 
finance, we assume that the objective of the firm is to maximise the value of the firm's 
shares'. 7 The objective of the company's risk management programme is therefore to 
maximise the value (present value of future net cash flows or the share price) of the 
company. 
8.2. The activities of risk management 
It is necessary to delimit the risk management activities included within the 
scope of this research. Any comprehensive risk management programme encompasses 
managing the risks inherent within the business in addition to those introduced through 
the use of financial instruments for reasons other than inherent risk management. The 
latter includes speculation8 and achievement of operational9 and strategic10 objectives. 
"This is supported by Ross and Westerfield (1988: 13), Brealy and Myers (1991: 5). Correra et al 
(1993: 12) and Keown (1994:2) and most standard financial texts. 
8 Geczy. Minton. and Schrand (1996) cite Ljungqvist L (1994), Asymmetric Information: A rationale 
for corporate speculation, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 3, 188 - 203. saying that equity 
holders are more likely to support the use of currency derivatives for speculation as a profit making 
activity, if equity shares are viewed as options on the value of a levered firm. or if managers of low 
output firms want to create noise to mimic high output firms. For speculation to be a profit-making 
activity in rational markets, a firm must either have an information advantage related to the price of 
the instruments underlying the derivatives, or it must have economies of scale in transactions allowing 
for profitable arbitrage opportunities. 
9 for example reducing the cost of capital 
1 0 Peter Tufano discusses how derivatives have broadened the strategic options available to firms in a 
fascinating article entitled ·How derivatives can advance corporate strategy' (Harvard Business 
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The objective of employing derivatives for operational and inherent business risk 
management is to manage the appropriate risk. The objective of employing derivatives 
for speculatory purposes is to make a profit. Risk management programmes are often 
considered to be concerned with the management of risks resulting from the use of 
derivative instruments. Indeed, a comprehensive risk management programmes in firms 
that speculate must be concerned with managing the risks introduced by the use of 
derivatives. In recent years the management of this risk has been refined through the 
adoption by non-financial companies of the 'value - at - risk' concept. 11 This technique 
objectively quantifies the risk introduced by holding financial assets. The strategic 
management decisions necessitated by the inclusion of speculation among the firms 
activities are well covered by academic theory. 12 However, this is not the definition 
that will be employed in this research. This paper will focus solely on the risk 
management activities designed to manage the underlying business risks, of which 
hedging is an integral, if not all encompassing part. 
B.3. Hedging and the role of forecasting 
Within academia there is some discussion as to the exact ambit of hedging. 
Brealy ( 1991: GS) defines hedging as buying one security and selling another in order 
to reduce risk. The academic definition of risk discussed in Section II.A is a 'measure 
their management would be the responsibility of the company's risk management department. See 
also Heston and Grieff (1990) for an early discussion on the subject. 
11 The essence of the value - at - risk (VAR) analysis is to generate a single financial estimate of the 
loss that may be incurred by a portfolio of financial market exposures that is associated with a selected 
probability level over a given future period. (MeVay: 1996: 49) The objective of the analysis is to 
measure the impact of changes in market conditions on the value of the hedges, assets, liabilities, 
revenues and expenses and ultimately the effect on the bottom line over time. (Sharma: 1996: 8). See 
also Me Vay J & Turner C, (1995), Styblo-Beder T. (1995), Parsley M, (1995), ShirreffD, (1995), 
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of the likelihood and magnitude of unanticipated changes' (Oxelheim and Wihlborg: 
1987 5). A change in a macroeconomic variable from today's value to a future value 
thus comprises an anticipated change (the difference between the current value and the 
forecasted value) and an unanticipated change (the change from the forecasted value to 
the actual value). Employing Oxelheim and Whilborg's definition, hedging should 
logically be concerned solely with the control of unanticipated changes. Other authors 
employ a more encompassing definition of hedging: 
... we adopt a fairly general definition of hedging in terms of the market value 
of the firm. Let V(S) be the value of the firm if it does not hedge, where S is a 
vector of state variables. Consider two firms, a and b, that differ from the firm 
with value V(S) only in their hedging policies. We say that firm a hedges more 
with respect to state variable i than firm b if the absolute value of the 
covariance of firm a with state variable i is less than or equal to that of firm b. 
Therefore, hedging reduces the dependence of firm value on changes in the 
state variable. Alternatively, we say that firm a hedges more than firm b if the 
absolute value of the covariance of the value of firm a with the value of an 
unhedged firm with the same production policy and capital structure is less 
than or equal to that of firm b. (Smith and Stultz: 1986: 392) 
A position in two or more securities whose returns are negatively 
correlated; taking opposite trading positions in a particular security. (Ross 
and Westerfield: 1988 : 832) 
. . . the acquisition of financial assets that reduce the variance of the 
firm's payoffs. (Smith and Stultz: 1985: 399) 
12 See for example Tufano P (l996a), Copeland T & Joshi Y (1996), Dolde (1993), Baldoni (1990), 
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Oxelheim and Whilborg's definition of risk as the unanticipated change is 
theoretically correct given that the variance is measured with respect to the expected 
value (in other words, the forecasted value). However, the risk management 
procedures used to hedge against unanticipated changes and those utilised to immunise 
the firm against anticipated changes, are integrally linked and are, certainly to an 
outsider, indistinguishable. This strict academic distinction is unnecessary for the 
purposes of this paper where the focus is on the practice of risk management. For 
simplicity's sake, therefore, the generic definitions of hedging will be utilised and the 
management of both anticipated and unanticipated changes will be included within the 
ambit of risk management. Risk thus refers to the measure and likelihood of changes in 
the value of the firm due to changes in macroeconomic variables. 
8.4. The tools of risk management 
A company can engage in corporate risk management usmg a number of 
techniques. These include the use of financial instruments and adjustment of 
operational strategies. Financial instruments include forwards, futures, options, swaps, 
combinations thereof or combinations with financing activities. These can be further 
divided into those that have a linear (e.g. forwards) or a non-linear (e.g. options) 
effect. Tufano (1996b) terms the linear effect, hedging (the shedding of all exposure) 
and the non linear, insurance (the shedding of downside exposure). 13 For the purposes 
of this paper this distinction will not be drawn as the focus is not on the methods or 
form of risk management, but rather on the level of risk management to be undertaken. 
13 For a discussion on the appropriateness of employing linear and non-linear strategies see Froot. 
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Operational strategies 14 include a scaling down of operations; or shifting a company's 
operations to a competitively advantageous place, for example, a low cost producing 
country (termed global relocation) 15 . Mergers and acquisitions are also important risk 
reducing tools employed by companies. 16 
There has been scant research into whether financial or operational tools should 
be employed to manage risk; (see Ambolia: 1996; Copeland and Joshi: 1996). Ambolia 
favours the use of financial tools saying that operational hedges are often more costly, 
imprecise, expensive, illiquid and time-consuming than financial hedges. (1996: 10) 
The flexibility in terms of size, materiality and denomination, introduced by employing 
financial instruments rather than adjusting operational strategies, is considerable. 
Because of the difficulties in distinguishing between operational changes undertaken 
for operational or risk management purposes, this research will take these strategies as 
predetermined and will focus solely on risk management activities involving financial 
instruments. 
It must be noted that the use of financial instruments to mitigate risk in South 
Africa has been severely hampered by an underdeveloped market. This has been due 
partially to the infancy of the market, however, restrictions imposed by authorities, 
notably exchange controls, are the predominate cause. SAFEX, the South African 
Futures Exchange, provides financial and agricultural futures and options but is unable 
to offer rand denominated derivatives whose underlying asset is a metal, as the Reserve 
Bank fears these could be used to speculate on the South African currency. 17 
14 These are distinct from and unrelated to the operational risk discussed in A. I. 
15 See van Eenennaam and Brouthers (1996) for a discussion thereof. 
16 For empirical research investigating the reasons why firms peruse risk reduction strategies such as 
diversification see May ( 199 5) and Arnihud and Lev ( 1981). 
1
' Standard Bank recently launched a new hedging tool for South African base metal producers 
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B.5. The efTect of risk management 
Risk management, when correctly implemented, can have one of three effects 
on risk: reduction, elimination or transformation. The reduction or elimination of risk is 
the objective of hedging. Their inclusion in this research is thus self evident. Risk can 
be transformed into a totally different type of risk. Additionally any partial hedge will 
transform any risk further into basis risk. The basis is the difference between the price 
implied by the hedging instrument and the underlying asset price. The risk is thus not 
that the absolute level will change, but rather that the differential between the implied 
and underlying price levels will change. Basis risk is therefore the risk that changes in 
the hedge price will not completely mirror changes in the underlying asset price. As 
hedges are seldom perfect18, this transformation into basis risk must be considered and 
if necessary, managed. 
B.6. Conclusion 
The operative definition of risk in the research is the magnitude and likelihood 
of changes in shareholder value resulting from changes in macroeconomic variables. 
The statistical definition of variance is employed. The present value of expected future 
net cash flows or share price proxies shareholder value. Risk management is the use of 
financial instruments to reduce or eliminate corporate financial exposure or to 
transform the risk to which the company or investor is exposed. Management of 
anticipated as well as unanticipated changes is included and there is no breakdown of 
18 A perfect hedge is where 'the hedging instrument is established in such a way that its price 
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the total effect of a change in the macroeconomic variable. Management of risk 
introduced through the use of financial instruments for non-operational objectives 
namely speculation and strategic, is not included. The research will focus on the use of 
financial tools only. 
C. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RISK MANAGEMENT THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 
C.1. Risk management in theory 
Academic financial literature since the 1950's, in particular market portfolio 
theory, has suggested that investors, and not firms, should undertake certain financing 
decisions. Modigliani and Miller, in their prescient 1958 article, established that a 
firm's financial policies are irrelevant when there are no taxes, no transaction costs, if 
information is freely available and the investment policies of a company are fixed. In 
other words, a firm's financial policy has no impact on the valuation of the firm. Risk 
management is an important component of the financial policies of firm and is therefore 
also irrelevant. Modigliani and Miller demonstrated that a firm will make money only if 
it undertakes investments that increase its operating cash flows. The manner of 
financing these investments is immaterial and merely determines how the firm's value is 
divided between its various investors. 
Thereafter Sharpe and Litner illustrated that investors were able to costlessly 
diversify away all specific risks. This implies that companies that manage their risks are 
18 A perfect hedge is where "the hedging instrument is established in such a way that its price 
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penalised by the market as risk management is costly and a firm that incurs these costs 
when the same result could have been costlessly achieved by the investor, does so 
unnecessarily. It would seem that the optimal division and quantum of risk 
management suggested by financial theory is one where the investor uses the available 
financial instruments to manage overall portfolio risk while no risk management is 
undertaken by the firm. The above is a brief overview of what appears to be the 
implicit assumption underlying much of the literature. 
C.2. Risk Management in practice 
In reality there is evidence of an increasing number of companies establishing 
corporate risk management programmes, or at the very least employing derivatives. A 
1995 survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit polled 100 senior financial and 
treasury managers. Only 5% indicated that they did not need derivatives (Corporate 
Finance: 1995). In 1993, Dolde surveyed the financial risk management practices of 
the Fortune 500 companies. 224 firms responded and over 85% reported using swaps, 
forwards, futures, or options in managing financial risk. 19 This widespread corporate 
risk management contradicts the theoretical view expounded above. This contradiction 
is illustrated by the following quotation: 
At first glance, one might expect that no firm in the gold mining industry 
would choose to manage gold price risk. Given an extensive gold derivatives 
market, investors can modify gold price risk almost as well as mining firms 
can. Given the reasonably transparent nature of the mining industry and the 
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derived from considerations of asymmetric i1iformation and dead-weight costs 
o.ffinancial distress seem almost irrelevant. Theory might predict that no firms 
manage gold price risk. 
To the contrary. the gold industry has embraced risk management: over 85 
percent of the firms in this industry used at least some sort of gold price risk 
management in 1990 - 1993. (Tufano: 1996: 1098) 
Popular explanations for the conflict between theory and practice include the 
scale and informational advantages experienced by firms. Additionally, the variety and 
quantity of risk management tools that are publicly available ensure that almost every 
macroeconomic contingency is covered. It could thus seem logical that firms with 
exposures should use these numerous available securities to manage changes in 
exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices. Indeed this appears to be the 
implicit view of many practitioners. Bauman and his co-authors from the Bank of 
America wrote in the 1995 Corporate Finance Risk Management and Derivatives 
Yearbook (3 ): 
A little more than a decade ago there were no market-imposed penalties for 
such complacency (not having a comprehensive risk management strategy in 
place) because the instn1ments and techniques for efficiently managing most 
types of price exposure were not available. Today. this is clearly not the case. 
Shareholders and creditors continue to refine their methods for assessing a 
company's long term risk-adjusted profitability, as measured by the stability 
and level of its returns. 
19 For further recent evidence of derivatives usage by US non-financial firms see Bodnar, Ha)t. 
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Similarly Pike and Neal, in their standard introductory textbook on corporate finance 
(1996: 10), state: 
Interest rates and exchange rates can vary considerably. The finance manager 
should take steps to ensure that exposure to adverse movements is adequately 
managed. Various techniques for hedging ... are available in this regard 
Notwithstanding, the above deduction is flawed (Oxelheim: 1987: 19-4). The logical 
conclusion is not that company should manage their risks but that the opportunity to 
manage their risks exists. 
The widespread use and importance of derivatives in practice is also evidenced 
by the large number and size of court battles concerned solely with risk management. 
The precedents which have been set may compel companies to undertake risk 
management merely to comply with the law. The diversity of the legal suits is 
noteworthy: companies are suing their banks for irresponsible selling of derivatives; 
shareholders are suing directors for failing to control treasury dealers in addition to 
negligence, and executives are being sued for failing to hedge their exposures properly. 
The defining case involves the directors of Brane, a United States grain 
elevator co-operative (Corporate Finance: 1995). In 1980 the directors were found 
guilty of breaching their fiduciary duty to shareholders because they failed to hedge 
against a fall in the price of grain. The judgement was upheld as the directors failed to 
'inform themselves adequately' of the available hedging opportunities that could have 
prevented their losses. Such findings seem to indicate that corporates have a legal duty 
to hedge against business risks through the use of derivatives. This puts company 
directors in the vulnerable position of being liable to lawsuits if they either fail to use 
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One of the most contentious cases of recent years involved an out of court 
settlement of $16 million by Compaq, a United States computer company. The 
company was sued by various small shareholders for breaching federal securities laws. 
The shareholders alleged that they bought Compaq shares on the basis of a misleading 
profit prediction statement released by the directors. The statement failed to disclose 
that no currency risk hedging strategy existed. Soon thereafter the value of the shares 
fell by 20%. 
The Securities and Futures Authority in London recently decreed that senior 
executive officers of securities houses should "take all reasonable steps to understand 
the firm's business or businesses". (Cape Times Business Report: 1996). This was 
prompted by the collapse of Barings Bank and implies that an excuse such as that 
offered by Peter Baring, an executive of Barings Bank, of not understanding the 
business that Nick Leeson20 was conducting will not be accepted. 
The number of significant losses incurred by companies as a result of 
derivatives use is additional evidence of the extensive use of risk management tools by 
companies. Examples of organisations that incurred these losses recently are 
Hammersmith and Fulham local authority, Metallgesellschaft, Kashima Oil, Orange 
County, Sumitomo, National Westminister Bank, Daiwa Bank, Sechold and Barings 
Bank. 
20 Nick Leeson was employed as a trader of Japanese futures and options at Barings Bank in 1989. 
Through a series of unauthorised trades he caused Barings Bank to accumulated losses of over £869 
million over a number of years. This resulted in the collapse of Barings Bank. Leeson was sentenced 
to six and a half years in a Singaporean goal. For further information see Fay S, (1996). The Collapse 
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C.3. Conclusion 
There is an apparent conflict between the predictions of traditional financial 
theory and what is observed in practice. Given certain assumptions, the Modigliani-
Miller indifference paradigm suggests that a firm's financial policy is irrelevant, i.e. it 
has no impact on firm valuation. Corporate risk management is an important 
component of a firm's overall financial policy, and is therefore also irrelevant. 
Observation of current business practice contradicts this conclusion. The use of 
derivatives, particularly for hedging, is widespread. The remainder of this paper is 
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Ill. THE FRAMEWORK 
A. OVERVIEW 
The extent to which any financial theory will prove useful and relevant in 
practice rests with its ability to offer meaningful and practicable explanations and 
predictions. This is dependant on the degree of realism in the assumptions underlying 
the theory. The evaluation of financial theories is thus a two stage process: an 
examination of the logic and a consideration of the relevance and realism of the 
underlying assumptions. It is, therefore, imperative that the assumptions of any theory 
are expressly examined. 
The objective in drawing up this framework is twofold: 
• to create a structure which facilitates the understanding and evaluation of the 
evolving body of literature attempting to justify corporate risk management; and 
• to investigate the validity of the implicit assumption that underlies most of this 
literature; viz. the irrelevance of risk management by the firm. 
Financial theory develops predictors of real world behaviour in the following 
way: an environment is constructed using standard financial and economic assumptions 
and conclusions regarding the behaviour of the parties under these assumptions are 
reached and investigated. This research suggests a structure within which the existing 
theories can be evaluated by systematically relaxing the standard financial and 
economic assumptions. The postulates which are based on the resulting restricted set 
of assumptions are then investigated. 
The traditional financial model suggests that it is irrelevant whether corporate 
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Modigliani Miller corporate risk management indifference paradigm. As was shown in 
section II, this prediction contradicts the observed widespread risk management 
activity occurring on a corporate level. It is therefore necessary to determine whether 
financial theory is deficient, or whether the risk management observed in practice is, in 
fact, illogical. Modigliani and Miller (1958), showed that a firm's financial policies 
(which include risk management) are irrelevant when there are no taxes, no transaction 
costs, if information is freely available and the investment policies of a company are 
fixed. 1 The following quotations illustrate that, given the Modigliani-Miller framework, 
a company should not manage risk. 
According to the A1odigliani-Miller paradigm, buying and selling oil option 
contracts cannot alter the company 's value, since individual investors in the 
company 's stock can always buy and sell contracts themselves if they care to 
adjust their exposure to oil prices. (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein: 1993: 1630) 
Thus risk aversion provides an unsatisfactory explanation for the 
observed volume - portfolio theory implies that, given well-diversified 
investors, corporate hedging does not benefit shareholders by reducing the 
firm's cost of capital. (Nance, Smith and Smithson 1993: 268) 
If one accepts the view of Modigliani and Miller, it follows almost as a 
corollary that risk management strategies are also of no consequence. They 
are purely financial transactions that don't affect the value of a company's 
operating assets. . . . a hard-line Modigliani-Miller disciple would argue 
1 Although Modigliani and Miller' s argument is widely regarded as the foundation. it was anticipated 
by Williams JB, (1938), The Theory of Investment Value, Harvard University Press. Cambridge: and 
Durand D. (1952), Cost of Debt and Equity Funds for Business: Trends and Problems of 
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against doing any risk management at all. (Froot, Scharj5tein and Stein: 
1994: 24) 
Modigliani and Miller show that, with fixed investment policy and with 
no contracting costs or taxes, corporate financing policy is irrelevant. (Smith 
and Stultz: 1985: 392) 
... Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani, ... , demonstrated that firms 
make money only if they make good investments . . . If they are right, it has 
crucial implications for hedging . . . Firms need not manage their financial 
risks; investors can do it for themselves. (Bishop: 1996: 15) 
The majority of the existing literature in this field attacks the Modigliani-Miller 
corporate risk management indifference paradigm. These studies claim that the 
Modigliani - Miller paradigm is not useful as its assumptions do not hold in reality. The 
assumptions are thus relaxed or altered and models of behaviour under the resulting 
'new' paradigm presented. For example, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein's (1993) model 
rests on the premises that there are inefficiencies within the capital market that result in 
a hierarchy of funds. Stultz ( 1984) postulates that the managers' divergence from 
shareholders' interests is significant enough to drop the assumption that the objective 
of the firm is to maximise profit. It must be noted that for any of the standard 
assumptions to be dropped on the grounds of being simplistic, irrelevant or 
unrepresentative of reality, it is necessary that: 
• the assumption is not critical to the paradigm; 
• the assumption is significantly violated in the real world; and 
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It is thus possible and instructive to classify the existing literature on financial risk 
management according to the assumptions which have been relaxed. The value of this 
approach is that it clarifies exactly what assumptions are required for the various 
postulates. 2 
The chapter proceeds as follows: the assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller 
indifference paradigm as it relates to risk management and their general implications 
are listed in section B. Behaviour under the assumptions is reviewed in the section C, 
while section D looks at the implications of relaxing these assumptions. Concluding 
remarks are made in the final section. 
B. THE ASSUMPTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
The theories which have been derived to explain risk management at a 
corporate level, rely critically on the relaxation of standard assumptions. These theories 
can be classified according to which assumptions need to be relaxed for the hypothesis 
to hold. The assumptions which are explicitly considered by this research are strongly 
rooted in, but not limited to the traditional assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller 
indifference paradigms. 
A.1. All markets, not just capital markets, are perfectly competitive and 
efficient. 
A.2. Information is perfect and can be acquired costlessly. 
2 Geczy, Minton. and Schrand ( 1996) organise the various theories into a single framework by 
discussing the incentives for derivatives use from the perspectives of managers, bondholders and 
equityholders. The theories are evaluated further by considering variation in a firm's cash flows and 
exposure to foreign exchange risk. Finally costs such as liquidity costs. transaction costs of 
customisation and basis risk are examined. This added structure is an alternative way of evaluating 
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Al. (perfect markets) and A2. (perfect costless information) indicate that the 
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis holds. Market efficiency implies that 
share prices respond instantaneously and in an unbiased manner to new information. 
Resultantly all relevant information is instantaneously and fully reflected therein. Price 
changes are random and no abnormal profit can consistently be made. Markets are 
perfectly competitive and products are atomistic. 
A.3. Transactions costs are zero. 
Brokerage costs and commissions do not exist: transactions occur at zero cost. 
A.4. No taxes exist. 
A.4. (no taxes) eliminates biased decision making motivated by the 
inefficiencies introduced by a tax regime. 
Perfect and costless information (A2.), no transaction costs (A3.) and no 
taxes (A.4.) imply that the firm does not experience any informational or cost scale 
advantages over investors. Firms and investors face the same costs when managing 
risks and the pool of risk management expertise in firms and investors is the same. 
A.5. All individuals undertake maximising behaviour. 
A.6. The objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder value. 
AS. (all individuals undertake maximising behaviour) ts a standard 
microeconomic assumption. A6. (the objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder 
value) is widely assumed in financial theory. Pike and Neal (1996: 10) explicitly state 
that '(i)n finance, we assume that the objective of the firm is to maximise the value of 
the firm's shares'. This is supported by Ross and Westerfield (1988: 13), Brealy and 
Myers (1991: 5), Correra et al (1993: 12) and Keown (1994:2) and most standard 
financial texts. Oxelheim and Whilborg' s methods of assessing risk ( 1987) assume that 
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future net cash flows, i.e. the maximisation of E [ Vj ] . This is a proxy for shareholder 
wealth. 
A.7. No principal-agent problems exist. 
It can be argued that A 7. (no principal-agent problems exist) follows from 
A.2.; given perfect, costless information, managers are perfectly controlled by the 
shareholders to implement value maximising strategies. However, A 7. has a large 
body of literature in its own right and is important enough to warrant separate 
inclusion. It must be understood that A 1. (perfect markets) implies that managers and 
workers can always find another equally attractive job. A.7. is required for A.6. 
(maximisation of shareholder value as the firm's objective) to hold. 
A.8. Risk neutrality 
The assumption of risk neutrality (A.8.) facilitates the use of expected values 
when evaluating choices. 
A.9. The investment policy of the firm is fixed. 
This assumption implies that the stream of operating cash flows from the firm's 
activities are independent of the financial policy of the firm, for example, the firm 
undertakes all positive net present value projects. 
In their 1958 paper, Modigliani and Miller only explicitly state A.6. (the 
objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder value) (pp 262 - 264) and A. I. (all 
markets are perfectly competitive and efficient) (p 267) as assumptions. However, it is 
commonly agreed that A.2. (perfect and costless information), A.3. (zero transaction 
costs) and A.4. (no taxes) are implicit assumptions which are necessary for their 
propositions to hold. Later versions of the Modigliani Miller theory do explicitly relax 
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C. BEHAVIOUR UNDER THE ASSUMPTIONS 
If a similar argument to that used in the Modigliani - Miller framework is 
followed, it is clearly irrelevant whether the firm or the investor undertakes risk 
management activities. The investors' expertise at risk management equals the firms' 
and the investor is as knowledgeable about the future. The access to and ability to 
employ risk management products is the same for an investor and a firm. Both parties 
have access to the same information for forecasts and on aggregate the same quantum 
of forecasting errors will be made. Both parties have the same objective: maximisation 
of shareholder value. Although strategies may differ, they are employed in pursuit of 
the same objective and thus on average will have the same outcome. The framework 
suggests that firm's and investors should be indifferent as to who undertakes corporate 
risk management. However, this prediction is contradicted by the extensive use of 
derivative products and introduction of risk management practices at a firm level. 
D. RELAXING THE ASSUMPTIONS 
All the current theoretical explanations for corporate risk management relax 
one or more of the framework's assumptions. The following quotations illustrate this 
point: 
(l)f the hedging policy affects the value of the firm, it must do so through 
taxes, contracting costs, or the impact of hedging policy on the firm 's 
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... (T)heoretical research provides several explanations for optimal 
hedging that result from different types of capital market imperfections. 
(Geczy, Minton and Schrand: 1996: 2) 
A number of the assumptions listed above may seem to be restrictive and 
simplistic. Relaxing them may thus present a more realistic explanatory model for the 
occurrence of corporate risk management. This introduces circumstances where, for 
example, firms may be able to manage risk internally in ways that cannot be replicated 
by investors. 
Shareholder value is maximised by undertaking cost minimising strategies. The 
existence of taxes affects the total cost structure of financial alternatives and thus 
biases decisions. The most common illustration is the tax deductibility of interest which 
changes the theoretically optimal mix of debt and equity. This may impact risk 
management strategies at a corporate level. 
Relaxing A.2. (perfect and costless information) introduces information 
asymmetries. Information is a valuable commodity which is conceptually identical to 
any other commodity (Lipsey: 1990). Markets therein are subject to inefficiencies and 
where differences in accessibility to information exist, information asymmetries arise. 
Firms have proprietary information. Reasons for retaining the privacy thereof may 
include its strategic importance in the firms' markets, or may merely be due to the cost 
of disseminating up-to-date news on the corporations' plans and other ventures to 
investors and/or the public. 
If the firm did experience informational or scale advantages, then it is clear that 
corporate risk management should be undertaken by the firm because of cost savings. 
This is because the economies of scale experienced by the firm results in a lower 
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quantum of risk management. The firm's superior information would mean that, on 
average, forecasting errors, and consequent losses made through incorrect risk 
management made by the investor, will be greater than those made by the firm. 
Once the principal-agent assumption is relaxed a number of intuitive 
explanations for hedging become clear. The 'no principal-agent problems' assumption 
stipulated within the environment of the framework, ensures that agency problems and 
costs do not exist. In reality, however, they are an important factor that has to be 
considered. Agency costs are incurred to ensure that the agent's actions are aligned 
with the principal' s intended actions. If risk management can be used to achieve the 
same effect at a lower net cost, value will have been added to the firm. A rationale for 
risk management is thus created. 
The intuitive belief that stakeholders within the firm are risk averse offers an 
appealing explanation for corporate risk management. Tufano (1996: 1129) mentions 
the following example: 
Marketers of corporate risk management products sometimes attempt to prey 
upon fear and risk aversion. One risk manager's advertisement, complete with 
images of stylised crocodiles and leopards, warns potential customers: 'In the 
complex financial jungle, you don 't dare make a move until you are positioned 
to survive . . . because one false step could risk your entire enterprise. ' 
Managers may undertake risk management activities in order to allay their own 
aversion to variability in the firm's value. In section VIII, the different objective 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The value of the process of systematically relaxing assumptions and thereby 
evaluating the theories that explain corporate risk management, is threefold. It 
provides: 
• a clearer understanding of the issues involved; 
• an illustration of the chasm between the predictions of financial theory and reality; 
and 
• a framework within which current literature can be classified and objectively 
evaluated. 
The remainder of the paper focuses on existing and potential explanations for 
corporate risk management. Each of assumptions will be lifted. This structure allows 
for a logical classification of the hypotheses which facilitates a clearer understanding of 
the concepts, and an awareness of the degree of realism in their underlying 
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IV. EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The second division of this paper commences with the section on empirical 
studies. This division examines the theories implied by the inefficiencies introduced 
through the relaxation of certain critical assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller 
indifference paradigm as it relates to risk management. In this section four of the 
important international empirical investigations into the determinants of corporate risk 
management are introduced. A brief overview of the methodology and data sources 
used in each, is presented. Various limitations of the studies are discussed. A summary 
of the salient features of each study can be found in Table IV. l. The results of the 
studies pertaining to each hypothesis are presented in sections V - IX. This section is 
merely a discussion of the methodology and a critique of four significant international 
empirical studies. The empirical investigation using South African data that is 
presented in this research, is based on this international research. It is predominantly 
based on Berkman and Bradbury ( 1996) and Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1996), 
however, elements of all the studies have been utilised in order to tailor the analysis to 
the South African environment. 
A. NANCE, SMITH, AND SMITHSON (1993) 
Nance, Smith, and Smithson's study is the earliest empirical research which is 
investigated. The research contributed to the prevailing body of knowledge when it 
was released as the variables tested were more comprehensive and wide-ranging than 
any prior study. Given changes in the regulatory environment, a number of these 
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examination. Nance, Smith, and Smithson ( 1993) provide evidence on the hypothesis 
that hedging increases firm value by decreasing expected taxes, expected costs of 
financial distress, or other agency costs. 169 firms from the Fortune 500 and the S&P 
400 in 1986 are surveyed. The use of survey data, by definition, introduces a sampling 
bias and consequently constrains the power of the results (Berkman and Bradbury: 
1996). All the later studies investigated avoided surveys as a data source. 
The data thus obtained is used to perform a univariate analysis of means and a 
logit regression analysis using a binary dependant variable: 1 for evidence of 
derivatives use (futures, forwards, options or swaps) and 0 for derivatives non-use. 
The choice of a dichotomous dependant variable is understandable given the limited 
public disclosures of derivatives usage. However, the binary nature limits the 
informational content of the conclusions. Generally, the higher the measurement scale 
of the data employed for statistical analyses, the richer the information content of the 
results. The authors did not explicitly limit the use of derivatives to hedging, therefore, 
the dependant variable 1 may include a firm which uses derivatives for speculatory 
purposes. The use of derivatives for speculatory purposes was specifically excluded 
from the ambit of this research in Section II. 
Most of the results are obtained by Nance et al are not statistically significant, 
however, the relationships are directionally consistent with the theory. The paper 
provides a comparison of results across six empirical analyses of corporate hedging. 
However, these studies were conducted from 1984 - 1990 and only test two variables. 
Their outdated and limited results are therefore not considered to meaningfully 
contribute to the current investigation. Although Nance, Smith, and Smithson's paper 
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historical development of the understanding of the determinants of corporate risk 
management. 
8. GECZY, MINTON, AND SCHRAND (1996) 
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand examine firms' use of currency derivatives in 
order to differentiate among existing theories of hedging behaviour. A sample of 372 
of the Fortune 500 non-financial firms for 1990 is employed. All firms in the sample are 
potentially exposed to foreign currency risk from foreign operations, foreign 
denominated debt, or a high concentration of foreign competitors in their industries. 
This is one of the first cross-sectional studies to examine the determinants of corporate 
derivatives use by employing the annual report disclosures required by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. 
A univariate test and a logit regression analysis are performed. The dependant 
variable is binary. It is defined as 1 if the firm discloses use of currency derivatives and 
0 if it does not. The categorical nature of the dependant variable limits the 
informational content of the results. This was discussed above. Geczy et al 
acknowledge that the dependant variable may measure speculation rather than hedging 
which would imply an overstatement of risk management and consequently biased 
results. However, because of the consistency of their results with models of optimal 
hedging behaviour, Geczy et al conclude that, on average, the firms examined are not 
speculating with currency derivatives. The standard criticisms about the use of 
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C. BERKMAN AND BRADBURY (1996) 
Berkman and Bradbury investigate the use of derivative financial instruments 
by all non-financial domestic corporations listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
in 1994 to determine the relevance of various hypotheses. The data is obtained from 
annual financial statements. 
Derivatives use is measured by the fair value (the absolute value of the net gain 
or loss on all derivatives outstanding at balance sheet date) and the contract value 
(notional value) of derivatives outstanding at the balance sheet date; both are scaled by 
the market value of the firm. Disclosure of these figures are required in the New 
Zealand annual financial statements. The use of annual financial statement disclosures 
introduces problems inherent with all accounting information. Additionally the figures 
are noisy because of the aggregation and netting that occurs with publicly available 
data. Berkman and Bradbury admit that the use of the fair value and contract value as 
measures of derivatives use is not perfect because of the above. However, figures for 
the hedge ratio, which is what they consider to be the ideal measure of the extent of 
risk management, are unavailable. 
Both a univariate non-parametric test and a tobit estimate test are performed. 
D. TUFANO (1996B) 
Using a new database that details corporate risk management activities in the 
North American gold mining industry over the years 1991 - 1993, Tufano tests 
whether cross-sectional differences in risk management activity can be explained by 
existing theory. Tufano's research is industry specific. Therefore, its applicability to 
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The dependant variable is classified as the average portfolio delta percentage. 
This is a firm-wide summary measure of the reported financial risk management. It 
represents the economic magnitude of risk modification activities across all types of 
transactions. The portfolio delta characterises the ounces of gold that the firm has 
effectively sold short through its financial risk management activities. This measure is 
scaled by size of the underlying exposure of the firm. The measure of risk management 
used by Tufano is all-encompassing. It does not distinguish between the different 
categories of risk management, thus all financial risk management activity is measured. 
This means that managing the risk inherent in employing instruments for speculation 
purposes is included with the management of underlying business risks. 1 Univariate 
tests as well as a tobit regression analysis are performed. The standard criticism about 
the use of accounting data applies although to a lesser extent as Tufano also employs a 
wide range of other, independent sources. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The papers mentioned above are significant international studies that have had 
an important impact on evolution of the theoretical and empirical research into the 
determinants of corporate risk management. A table summarising the salient features of 
each of these international studies is presented hereafter. The remaining sections of this 
division discuss the hypotheses that are suggested by the relaxing of the assumptions 
listed in Section 111.B. The results of the four international empirical studies pertaining 
to each hypothesis are included in the relevant sections. 
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Table IV 1. Comparison of empirical analyses C?f rationales for corporate risk management 
Nance, Smith, and Gkzy, Minton, and Berkman and Tufano (1996) 
Smithson (1993) Scbrand (1996) Bradbury (1996) 
Year 1986 1991 1994 1991 - 1993 
Sample size 169 372 116 48 
Sample drawn from Fortune 500 and S&P Fortune 500 New Zealand Stock North American Gold 
400 Exchange Mining firms 
Source of information Survey Annual Financial Annual Financial Annual Financial 
Statements and Statements and Statements and 
Independent sources Independent sources Independent sources 
Univariate and Multivariate study Yes Yes Yes Yes 
performed 
Derivatives use measured by a Yes Yes No No 
dichotomous variable 
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V. IMPERFECT MARKETS 
Relaxing the assumption of perfect markets introduces a number of 
inefficiencies that have been employed to justify the firm undertaking risk management 
activity. 
A. CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS 
A.1. Froot, Scharfstein And Stein (1993) 
One of the most conceptually developed theories of corporate risk management 
was introduced by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein in 1993 1. The central tenet is that 
without risk management firms are compelled to pursue suboptimal investment 
policies. The model is founded on Myers' (1977) pecking order theory. This hierarchy 
of funds hypothesis posits capital market imperfections and information asymmetries. 
Given these inefficiencies, funds which are raised externally are more expensive than 
internally generated funds. Moreover, Myers suggested that equity is more expensive 
to raise than debt. Consequently a hierarchy of funds exists: internally generated funds 
are the least expensive, followed by debt and then equity.2 This theory endogenises 
bankruptcy costs (Geczy, Minton, and Schrand: 1996), thus it must be noted that by 
developing Myers' hierarchy of funds, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein also extend Smith 
and Stultz (1985) and Stultz (1984) theories where risk management creates value by 
reducing expected bankruptcy costs. (See Section VIII.B.4.) 
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Froot, Scharfstein and Stein claim that the financial constraints introduced by 
capital market imperfections create underinvestment costs. Given this cost structure of 
funds, managers prefer to utilise internally generated monies and will reject certain 
positive net present value projects if external parties have to provide finance. 
Variations in cash flows or earnings resulting from changes in interest rates, exchange 
rates and commodity prices could result in the firm not having sufficient internally 
generated funds to undertake all profitable investments. In this instance, the firm is 
faced with the prospect of raising external finance. Given that raising money externally 
is more costly, the company may choose to abandon or scale back these remaining 
positive net present value projects. 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein claim that when corporations do not have enough 
cash internally they tend to cut investment spending more than proportionately. A 
study performed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson3 is quoted. These results showed 
that companies reduced their capital expenditures by roughly 3 5 cents for each $1 
reduction in cash flow. 
A company with a planned investment schedule may underinvest if variations in 
exchange rates, commodity prices or interest rates result in a shortfall of internally 
generated funds. Risk management can add value if it is utilised to reduce these 
variations such that sufficient cash is always available to undertake profitable 
investments. Risk management does not add value by itself but ensures that the 
company has the funds available when they are required and in this way reduces 
underinvestment costs. Risk management breaks the dependence of investment on cash 
2 Myers ( 1977: 582) points out that writers on managerial capitalism have interpreted firm's reliance 
on internal funds as a by-product of the separation of ownership and control: professional managers 
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flow. An example which appears in the literature is that of Merck, an American 
pharmaceuticals firm, which spends a substantial amount on investment, specifically on 
research and development. Merck has spearheaded the use of risk management tools to 
ensure that investment plans are always able to be internally financed. Bishop ( 1996: 
15) quotes Judy Lewitt and John Kearney, Merck executives: 'our experience and that 
of the (drugs) industry in general, has been that cash flow and earnings uncertainty 
caused by exchange rate volatility leads to a reduction in research spending.' 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein hypothesise that risk management adds value to a 
firm and is thus undertaken by corporations with planned future investment and costly 
external financing. 
i. The model 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein's (1993) two-period model incorporates a 
marginal cost - marginal benefit relationship that explicates the interplay between 
investment and financing decisions. A firm can undertake positive net present value 
projects utilising first period wealth. Externally generated funds are raised when first 
period wealth is not sufficient to cover the full investment required. Froot, Scharfstein 
and Stein assume that even though no observable costs exist, managers act as if there 
are real economic costs attached to raising funds externally. These include the costs of 
bankruptcy and financial distress (direct and indirect); agency costs associated with 
motivating and monitoring managers who are no longer full residual claimants; and 
managers' private benefits which arise from limiting dependence on external funds. 
3 
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Wealth is thus the profit generated from the positive net present value projects reduced 
by the costs associated with raising external finance. 
The justification for risk management creating value hinges critically on the 
concavity of the profit function. 4 The model is derived backwards by assuming that risk 
management has been utilised to completely hedge all movements in wealth such that 
expected random second period wealth becomes certain. A standard maximisation of 
profit function is derived given costly external financing. Using the first and second 
order conditions the optimal level of risk management is found. Given costly external 
financing the level of investment suggested by the model is lower than the first best 
level where all profitable projects would be undertaken. 
The second derivative of profit is manipulated to yield an equation showing 
that the optimum level of investment is a function of the level of internal wealth and the 
marginal returns on investment. Risk management adds value if the function is globally 
negative. This implies that two conditions are necessary for risk management to be 
beneficial: marginal returns on investment must be decreasing and the level of internal 
wealth must have a positive impact on the optimal level of investment. The latter 
condition is a common feature of models with costly external financing where 
information asymmetries or principal-agent problems are introduced. The former is a 
common economic assumption. Thus it can be assumed that risk management should 
be undertaken by a firm. 5 
4 This is a necessary condition if risk management is to be beneficial. 
5 In Froot, Scharfstein and Stein's (1993) model shareholders are repaid their entire investment at the 
end of the second period. It is therefore not possible to explore the effects of increasing investment 
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The model reqmres the relaxation of the following assumptions: perfect 
information (A.2.), no principal-agent problems (A.7.), and a fixed investment schedule 
(A.9.). 
ii. Empirical findings 
In Nance, Smith, and Smithson's (1993) research, growth options in a firms' 
investment opportunity set are proxied by research and development expenditures 
scaled by firm size and the ratio of the book value to the market value. The liquidity 
ratio represents the availability of funds. Univariate tests indicate that firms which 
undertake hedging have significantly larger research and development expenditures 
than non-hedgers. No significant difference is found in the book to market ratio. The 
results of the restricted logit regressions indicate that firms with higher research and 
development expenditures are more likely to hedge. The liquidity ratio is very 
insignificant. 
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand ( 1996) use three variables as measures of the 
growth opportunities available to a firm: the ratio of research and development 
expenditures to sales; the ratio of capital expenditures for property, plant and 
equipment to firm size; and the book value of a firms' common equity scaled by its 
market value. To determine the availability of internally generated funds, the long term 
debt ratio and the quick ratio6 are utilised. Lower long term debt ratios and higher 
quick ratios would suggest that more internally generated funds are available for use in 
investment. 
The results of the univariate tests show that firms that use currency derivatives 
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opportunities. Research and development ratios show the greatest significance. The 
logit regression analysis indicates that financing constraints provide incentives for 
hedging. Higher quick ratios imply a significantly lower probability of using currency 
derivative instruments. Geczy et al conclude that firms with greater growth 
opportunities and tighter financial constraints are more likely to use currency 
derivatives. 
Capital market imperfections are tested using two variables in Berkman and 
Bradbury's (1996) study. Long term growth prospects are represented by the earnings-
price ratio. The ability to generate cash to finance short term asset growth is measured 
by the natural logarithm7 of the ratio of the current year's change in net tangible assets 
plus depreciation to net income plus depreciation. The results support the suggestion 
that the earnings-price ratio is higher for firms that use derivatives, however, the 
measure of the ability to finance short term asset growth is lower for these firms. 
Tufano ( 1996b) introduces two measures for the investment opportunities 
facing gold mining firms: expenditures on exploration and the value of attempted 
acquisitions. Both are scaled by firm value. Tufano points out that a drop in gold prices 
and consequent reduction in cash flow could slow the major investment programmes of 
mining firms. The hypothesised relationship between the extent of risk management 
and these two proxies is therefore positive. However, a negative relationship between 
explorations activities and risk management is found. This is contrary to Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein's predictions. In addition, the proposed relationship between the 
extent of risk management undertaken and acquisition activities is not supported. Thus 
Tufano concludes that the theories justifying risk management on the basis of costly 
6 By excluding inventory from current assets, the quick ratio becomes a more stringent measure of 
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external financing affecting investment activity are not supported strongly in the North 
American gold mining industry. The availability of internally generated funds is not 
tested. 
A.2. Size theory 
The F root, Scharf stein and Stein ( 1993) argument hinges on costly external 
financing and predicts that firms for which external financing is costly would be more 
likely to use risk management. It is reasonable to suspect that information asymmetries 
or transaction costs for small firms are greater than for larger corporations. If so, 
theory predicts an inverse relationship between firm size and the extent of risk 
management. 8 Tufano measures firm size by firm value and the value of the reserves 
that a firm holds. Neither test produces significant results. 
8. LEGAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS 
Inefficient behaviour is often necessitated by the legal system. In the discussion 
on risk and risk management a number of legal cases involving derivatives use are 
highlighted (Section II.C.2.). The legal precedent arising from these cases may compel 
firms to undertake risk management in spite of optimal policies suggested by the 
theory. 
7 Henceforth. the term 'log' implies 'the natural logarithm'. 
8 Academics have conflicting views on the effect of size on firms' risk management policies. This is 
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C. LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTIONS 
C. l. Signalling Managerial Skill 
This theory focuses on the labour markets' perception of managerial ability. 
Because of information asymmetries, managerial reputations can not be directly 
observed and are indicated by managerial performance. Managers are thus encouraged 
to undertake risk management in an attempt to influence their firms' performance and 
thereby influence labour market perceptions. This theory relies critically on relaxing 
two further assumptions; namely, the perfect information (A.2.) and principal-agent 
(A. 7.) assumptions. This hypothesis is discussed in the section on information 
asymmetries (Section VI). 
D. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Market imperfections give rise to situations where risk management can add 
value to a firm. Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms with substantial research and 
development expenditures do safeguard investment cash flows through hedging. The 
results of the empirical investigations are mixed, nevertheless all expect Tufano 
( 1996b) find at least one variable has a significant relationship with risk management. 
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VI. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
The impact of asymmetric information is one of the least explored aspects of 
the determinants of corporate risk management policies and has only begun to receive 
explicit attention in the very recent past. 1 The work in this generic area has received 
the most attention from economists and is specifically focused on game theory. 2 Two 
rationales for corporate risk management which depend critically on information 
asymmetries have been developed. Both hinge on extensions of basic signalling theory. 
A. SIGNALLING MANAGERIAL SKILL: BREEDEN AND 
VISWANATHAN (1996) AND DEMARZO AND DUFFIE (1995) 
This theory focuses on the markets' perception of managers' skill i.e. 
managerial reputation. Reputations are determined by managerial ability. Markets 
cannot observe managerial ability directly and thus rely on the performance of the firm 
run by the manager as a proxy for their ability. If managers can utilise risk management 
to manipulate firm performance, they can vicariously influence the market's perception 
of their ability. The theory predicts that there is a positive relationship between the 
degree of information asymmetry in the labour market regarding managerial ability and 
the extent of risk management undertaken by the firm. 
1 James Mirrlees and William Vickery were awarded the 1996 Nobel prize in economics for their 
work on the economics of information asymmetries. Although their work was not directly concerned 
\\'ith risk management. using the tools they developed it may be possible to adapt their models to be 
relevant to this subject. For a brief overview of their work see The Economist: 1996. 
2 For an excellent game theory reference see Rasmusen E, (1994), Games and Information, Second 
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A.1. DeMano and Duffie's model 
DeMarzo and Duffie's (1995) approach differs from the models discussed 
elsewhere in this paper as it focuses on the informational effect as opposed to the risk 
reallocation function of risk management. DeMarzo and Duffie posit that risk 
management reduces the amount of noise and increases the informational content of 
firms' profits. The authors develop a model which predicts the optimal level of 
disclosure and related risk management. 3 This facilitates the exploration of the 
information effect of financial risk management. The model assumes that managers' 
future salaries are determined by the markets' perception of their ability and concludes 
that managers can have a direct impact on the risk of their future salaries. Because 
managers' reputations are surmised from the firms' performance, managers can 
influence the perception of their ability and consequently their salaries by reducing the 
risk of the firms' current performance through risk management. Managers' 
preferences regarding their future income can thus provide a motive for risk 
management. DeMarzo and Duffie's model presumes that outsiders are unable to 
separate a company's profits or losses which are attributable to risk management from 
those attributable to managerial ability. In addition to patronising market observers, 
this is a violation of the efficient market hypothesis. This model requires the 
assumptions of perfect markets ( A.2. ), no principal-agent problems (A. 7. ), and a fixed 
investment schedule (A.9.) to be relaxed. 
There have been no empirical tests which have assessed this model. Tufano 
( l 996b) discusses the theory but considers the US gold mining industry to be 
transparent with respect to signalling managerial ability. Similarly, Geczy, Minton, and 
3 DeMarzo and Duffie also discuss the consequences of alternative accounting policies and suggest 
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Schrand (1996) do not test this theory as their chosen sample does not present any 
testable implications thereof. 
B. PROPRIETARY INFORMATION HELD BY FIRMS: DEMARZO 
AND DUFFIE (1991) 
DeMarzo and Duffie's (1991) model suggests that when a firm has information 
of which shareholders are unaware, risk management undertaken by the firm may be 
beneficial. The hypothesis presents an optimisation model which posits that 
undertaking risk management signals the reduction in variability of a firms' profits and 
therefore reduces the degree of information asymmetry between the firm and the 
shareholder. A positive relationship between risk management and firms with greater 
information asymmetries is thereby predicted. Although the initial section of the model 
retains the no principal-agent problems assumption (A 7. ), this is relaxed in later parts. 
Transaction costs (A.3.) are introduced. 
B.2. Empirical findings 
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1996) employ the percentage of institutional 
ownership and the number of investment firms with analysts following the firm as 
proxies for the degree of information asymmetry. It is assumed that these measures are 
positively related to the availability of information and thus negatively related to risk 
management. The results of both tests did not support this hypothesis. The univariate 
test showed that non-users of derivatives exhibited less informational asymmetry i.e. 
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institutional ownership. The logit results showed a positive relationship between the 
number of analysts following the firm and the likelihood of a firm using currency 
derivatives. Geczy et al point out, however, that the firms which undertake risk 
management are generally larger firms and are consequently more important 
economically and will therefore attract attention from analysts. This model is not tested 
empirically in the other studies. 
C. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The relative infancy of this particular field within finance means that little 
empirical or theoretical research has been performed to date. It is therefore not 
possible to draw meaningful conclusions about the relevance of informational 
asymmetry hypotheses in the real world. However, the scope for development of the 
theoretical aspect of information asymmetry hypotheses, in particular, is wide and a 
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VII. CONVEXITY OF THE TAX SCHEDULE 
A. REDUCING EXPECTED TAXES 
The structure of the prevailing tax code and its effect on the value creation of 
firms' financial policies has been extensively examined in the debate surrounding the 
Modigliani - Miller capital structure indifference theorem. Similar principles apply to 
risk management. Theories suggest that firms facing convex tax functions can add 
value by managing risk and thus reducing expected taxes. The effect of risk 
management on expected taxes is one of the most developed areas in this literature and 
has been comprehensively empirically tested. Risk management can only reduce 
expected taxes and consequently add value if the tax schedule is convex. Convexity is 
introduced by assessed (tax) loss carryforwards and a progressive tax regime. The 
extent to which risk management can add value is dependant upon the degree of 
convexity and the proportion of taxable income that occurs in the convex region of the 
tax schedule. 
A.1. The model 
Smith and Stultz (1984) demonstrate that risk management adds value to a 
unlevered firm which faces taxes. The value of a firm is set equal to the before-tax 
value less the quantum of taxes. The firm faces two states of the world such that the 
expected taxes under one state is greater than under the other state. The firm holds a 
self-financing hedge portfolio1 which is constructed such that the payoffs under each 
1 A self-financing portfolio implies that the sum of the payoffs of the portfolio given the probability of 
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state added to the value of the firm in that state are identical. The value of the hedged 
firm less the value of the unhedged firm is greater than zero. This proves that 
undertaking risk management will add value to a firm. The model assumes costless risk 
management. However, Smith and Stultz point out that risk management can still add 
value ifthe no transaction costs assumption (A.3.) is lifted. This occurs when the costs 
of risk management do not exceed the benefits. Similar theoretical justifications are 
discussed in other articles; see for example Froot, Scharfstein and Stein ( 1993) and 
Smith ( 1990). 
A.2. Example illustrating how risk management can add value 
The following example illustrates how risk management can add value to a firm 
by reducing expected taxes (Smith: 1990). A company has an equal probability of 
receiving a taxable income of -400 or 600 in the same period. To isolate the tax effect 
assume no transaction costs, a fixed investment schedule and zero interest. The current 
South African company tax rate is 35%. 
T ( E [ TI ]) = T ( 0. 5 * -400 + 0. 5 * 600 ) 
= T ( 100) 
= 35 
where 
T =tax on 
TI = taxable income 
The tax on the expected taxable income is 3 5. 
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i. The effect of assessed loss carryforwards 
If the company is allowed to carry forward 100% of its assessed loss, risk 
management does not add value as the tax on the expected taxable income ( 3 5 -
Eq.VII.1.) is identical to the expected tax (35 - below). 
E [ T ] = 0. 5 * T ( -400 ) + 0. 5 * T ( 600 ) 
=0.5 * 0+0.5 * 70 
= 35 
(Eq.VII.2.) 
If the tax regime only permits a fraction (assume 50%) of the assessed loss to be 
carried forward, the tax on the expected taxable income ( 35 - Eq.VII.1.) will be less 
than the expected tax (70 - below). 
E [ T ] = 0. 5 * T ( -400 ) + 0. 5 * T ( 600 ) 
=0.5 * -70+0.5 * 210 
= 70 
(Eq.VII.3.) 
The company would clearly prefer to pay the tax on the expected income ( 3 5 -
Eq.VIl.1.). By hedging the company could ensure a 100% probability of generating 
taxable income of 100. In this case the company could guarantee an expected tax of 35 
(below). 
E[T]=l*T(lOO) 
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Thus the benefit from undertaking risk management is 3 5: the expected tax in an 
unhedged position (70 - Eq. VII.3.) less the expected tax in a hedged position (35 -
Eq. VII.4.). In this scenario risk management has created value. 
The greater the degree of convexity, the greater the benefit from hedging. For 
example, if none of the assessed loss is able to be carried forward, the expected tax is 
105 (below). 
E [ T ] = 0. 5 * T ( -400 ) + 0. 5 * T ( 600 ) 
=0.5 * 0+0.5 * 210 
= 105 
(Eq.VII.5.) 
In this case the company is obviously worse off and thus the ability to manage risk 
becomes more valuable. The benefit from hedging rises to 70 (105 - Eq. VII.5. minus 
35 Eq. VII.4.). 
ii. The effect of a greater proportion of taxable income in the convex region of the tax 
schedule 
The tax benefit of managing risk is a positive function of the proportion of 
taxable income in the convex region of the tax schedule. If the distribution of taxable 
income assumed in the example above is shifted to the right, less lies in the convex 
region. Suppose that the company has an equal probability of receiving a taxable 
income of -200 and 800 and that none of the assessed loss is able to be carried 
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T ( E [TI]) = T ( 0.5 * -200 + 0.5 * 800) 
= T ( 300) 
= 105 
The expected tax would increase to 140 (below). 
E [ T] = 0.5 * T ( -200) + 0.5 * T ( 800) 





The benefit from hedging in this instance is 35 (140 - Eq. VIl.7. minus 105 Eq. 
VII.6.).This is less than the 70 derived above. 
iii. Statutory progressivity in a South African context 
Under a progressive tax regime, higher taxable income attracts a higher tax 
rate. If a company's earnings fluctuate, the tax bill will be reduced by 'smoothing' the 
income over the years such that the average tax rate paid is lowered. South Africa's 
current tax regime results in a linear tax schedule because of the flat corporate tax rate 
of 3 5% and 100% assessed loss carryforwards. Therefore the rationale for hedging 
creating value does not hold in a South African context. 
A.3. Empirical findings 
Nance, Smith, and Smithson ( 1993) perform the most comprehensive 
investigation into the observed relationship between the convexity of the tax schedule 
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credits represents the availability of tax preference items. The probability of a firm 
facing progressive tax rates is indicated by the range of the firm's pretax income in the 
progressive region. 2 Tax loss carry forwards are also investigated. 
The findings indicate that firms which face convex tax schedules undertake risk 
management to a greater extent. The result is especially significant for firms with more 
tax credits and more of their income in the progressive region of the tax schedule. 
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand ( 1996) measure the availability of tax preference 
items by using the book value of net operating loss carryforwards outstanding scaled 
by total assets. Neither the univariate nor the logit test generated a statistically 
significant result that supported the hypothesis. 
A dichotomous (1 or 0) variable is employed to indicate the existence of tax 
loss carryforwards in Berkman and Bradbury's (1996) study. The univariate study 
indicates that firms with derivatives are more likely to have tax losses carried forward. 
Furthermore, the tobit analysis shows strong support for the view that firms use 
derivatives to increase the present value of tax losses. 
Tufano ( 1996) employs tax loss carry forwards scaled by firm value to 
investigate the hypothesised relationship. The results indicate that tax loss 
carryforwards have little predictive power in the North American gold mining industry: 
no statistically significant relationship is found. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The tests do not show strong support for the tax convexity hypothesis. Nance, 
Smith, and Smithson ( 1993) do generate significant results using the available 
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investment tax credits and the probability of a firm facing progressive tax rates 
variables. These variables are not investigated in the other studies. The nature of the 
prevailing South African tax regime does not allow for a convex tax structure as 
assessed losses are carried forward and companies face a flat tax rate of 35%. Thus the 
above theory is not applicable in this country and there can be no justification for risk 
management adding value to a company through reducing expected taxes. The 
reduction of expected taxes hypothesis has been thoroughly investigated on the 
conceptual front. In addition, given the results of the empirical studies, it would seem 
that the theory holds little predictive value in reality. Thus this area is not seen as a rich 
source of potential future research. 
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VIII. PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS 
An agency relationship is defined in Jensen and Meckling's seminal article 
(1976:306) as: 'a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent.' Economic and financial 
theory assumes that, ceteris parabus, all parties are utility maximisers. There is thus 
good reason to believe that the utility-maximising agent will not always act in the best 
interests of the principal. Consequently an agency relationship will introduce agency 
problems: conflicts of interests which arise when self interested individuals have to co-
operate. It is therefore impossible, as Jensen and Meckling point out, to ensure, at zero 
cost, that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal's point of view. The 
principal can encourage the agents to adapt their self-serving interests by introducing 
incentives and incurring costs. Agency costs are defined as the sum of 
• the monitoring expenditures by the principal; for example, stringent reporting 
requirements or management audits; 
• the bonding expenditures by the agent; for example, restrictive covenants and the 
provision of collateral; and 
• the residual loss1 (Jensen and Meckling: 306). 
The two classic principal-agent relationships within a firm are the shareholder -
manager and shareholder - debtholder relationships. Each of these will be examined in 
turn. Theories which attempt to explain the value of risk management are discussed 
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A. SHAREHOLDER - MANAGER CONFLICT 
Separation between ownership and control of the firm has evolved in tandem 
with the development of the modern corporation. The ownership of most large 
companies is diffuse, with the day-to-day control of the business resting in the hands of 
managers (agents) who are appointed by the shareholders (principals) through the 
directors. A potential conflict arises when ownership and management separate as 
managers will act in their own interests or maximise their own utility instead of 
maximising shareholders' utility. Shareholders can encourage managers to change their 
behaviour, such that they act in shareholders' best interests, by incurring agency costs. 
These include introducing appropriate incentives, usually in the compensation package, 
and monitoring managers' behaviour. 
A.l. Studies of firms' objectives 
The prediction that firms, which are controlled by managers, do not necessarily 
maximise shareholder wealth, is borne out by a number of studies. Westerfield (1988: 
14) quotes the results of a series of interviews, conducted by Donaldson2, with the 
chief executives of several large corporations. Donalds_on concluded that the 
manager's basic financial objective was based on their underlying motivation when 
defining the corporate mission. Three motivational forces were identified: 
1. Survival. Organisational survival is ensured by management always controlling 
sufficient resources to support the firm's activities. 
1 The residual loss is defined as the divergence between the agents' decisions and those decisions 
which would maximise the welfare of the principal. It is the dollar equivalent of the reduction in 
welfare. 
2 Donaldson G. (1984). Afanaging Corporate Wealth: The Operations of a Comprehensive Financial 
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2. Independence. This is the freedom to make decisions and take action without 
encountering external parties or depending on outside financial markets. 
3. Self-sufficiency. Managers do not want to depend on external parties. 
Maximisation of corporate wealth is determined to be the objective of managers. 
Donaldson distinguishes between corporate wealth and shareholder wealth. Corporate 
wealth tends to lead to increased growth by providing funds for growth and limiting 
the extent to which equity is raised. This is the wealth over which management has 
effective control and is closely aligned to increased size and growth. This concept is 
distinct from that of shareholder wealth. 
Research by Pike and Doi (1989) and updated in Pike and Neal (1996: 11) has 
shown that maximisation of shareholder wealth is not the only goal of management, 
nor is it the most important. The finance directors of the largest UK companies were 
asked to rank specified goals in order of importance. Managers are more concerned 
with profitability than wealth creation. The results are summarised in Table VIII. 1. 
Table VIII. 1. The importance of financial objectives: the percentage of finance 
directors of JOO large UK firms viewing objectives as 'very important' 
1980 (%) 1986 (%) 1992 (%) 
Short term (1-3 years) 
Profitability (e.g. return on investment) 54.7 71.7 69.0 
Earnings 42.2 56.1 58.0 
Long term (over 3 years) 
Sales growth 20.7 9.5 14.1 
Earnings per share growth 9.0 56.3 55.1 
Growth in shareholder wealth 19.8 45.7 52.6 
Source: Pike and Neal (1996) 
The table implies that short term goals are more important than long term goals. This 
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compensation is dependant on their performance in the short term. The increasing 
importance of the long term goals, specifically those which relate to shareholder value, 
suggests that the agency problem is being addressed more effectively and measures 
such as incentive schemes have been successful. 
Studies done in other countries have produced different results. Research by 
Kagono performed in 1985 (quoted in Pike and Neal: 1996), indicates that the 
objectives of Japanese companies are primarily profitability, market share and new 
product development, while shareholder wealth maximisation is not important. It must 
be noted that this study was done over a decade ago and it is possible that Japan may 
have experienced similar trends to the UK as shown in the table above. Therefore, the 
relative importance of shareholder goals may have increased. 
Shareholders do not choose the risk management policies of the firm, but 
managers do. Shareholders, however, choose managerial compensation contracts 
which encourage managers to undertake risk management practices that maximise their 
wealth and consequently the value of the firm. 
A.2 Theories to explain risk management when principal-agent problems exists 
i. Lifetime utility maximisation: Stultz (1984) 
Stultz assumes that principal-agent problems exist and that managers are risk 
averse and managers maximise their expected lifetime utility. Shareholders have 
recognised that managers will not act in shareholders' best interests and have 
structured their compensation packages such that managers' income is an increasing 
function of the changes in the value of the firm. Agency costs are thereby incurred. 
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compensation contract, including perquisites and fringe benefits, and their expectations 
of the actions shareholders or other potential investors can take to decrease their 
expected utility. Stultz's model assumes that shareholder value is determined by the 
value of the firm. Principal-agent problems are presumed to exist. By introducing a 
fixed managerial compensation contract that is an increasing function of the changes in 
value of the firm, the model effectively realigns managers' and shareholders' 
objectives. The model is comprehensively discussed under the section on the relaxation 
of the risk neutrality assumption (Section IX). 
ii. Signalling Managerial Skill 
This theory focuses on the markets' perception of managers, specifically 
managerial reputation. Reputations are determined by managerial performance. 
Managers are thus encouraged to undertake risk management, thereby affecting the 
firm's performance, in an attempt to influence labour market perceptions. This theory 
relies critically on relaxing the perfect information (A2.) and perfect markets (A 1.) 
assumptions in addition to the principal-agent assumption (A 7.) and is consequently 
discussed in Section VI.A I. 
iii. The influence of managerial motives on firms' risk reduction strategies 
May (1995) empirically tests the relationship between managers' personal risk 
preferences and firm decisions. May's results are not directly applicable to this research 
as the risk reduction referred to focuses on diversification strategies, specifically 
conglomerate mergers and acquisitions. These were classified under the risk 
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spectrum of this research is defined to encompass solely the financial risk management 
instruments such as forwards, futures, options and swaps. The proxies May employs 
for chief executive officers' motives are years with the firm; proportion of personal 
wealth vested in firm equity; asset specific expertise; and the firm's recent 
performance. May's findings suggest empirical support for the view that risk reduction 
decisions at a firm level are affected by managerial motives. 
B. SHAREHOLDER - DEBTHOLDER CONFLICT 
The relationship between debtholders and shareholders is one of the most 
important examples of principal - agent conflict. Two 'classic' areas ofthis conflict are 
the underinvestment problem and the distortion of investment problem (Ross and 
Westerfield: 1988: 486). Both of these illustrate circumstances under which 
shareholders can benefit at the debtholders' expense. Opportunities whereby hedging 
can be used to eliminate this conflict and reduce borrowing costs are thus introduced. 
B.1. The 'distortion of investment' problem 
The 'distortion of investment' problem illustrates that it is in the interests of 
shareholders to engage in projects that increase the variability of a firm's cash flows 
when a firm is funded by debt. When shareholders undertake a risky project in 
preference to a safe one a portion of the risk of the project failing is transferred to 
existing debtholders. These existing debtholders are not compensated for assuming this 
additional risk. Expressed differently, if a firm faces bankruptcy or has a low value, 
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is potentially profitable but risky, will be accepted by the shareholders as it may 
generate a return for them. The project may also generate a loss, however, this will be 
borne by the debtholders as the shareholders' loss is limited to their initial investment 
in the firm. 
A simple numerical example illustrates the point. In a single period world a firm 
has borrowed 20 units of debt which are repayable at the end of the period. The firm is 
faced with two mutually exclusive projects: Project I and Project II. Each project has a 
50% possibility of generating a certain quantum of income. This level of income 
obviously affects the final value of the firm. The following tables show how the 
expected value of the projects is divided between debt and equity holders. 
Table V/11.2 Outcomes of safe Project I 
I Value at the end Probability :. E [ V] 
of the period 
Firm as a whole 20 0.5 
VF= E [VF]= 40 
60 0.5 
Debt 20 0.5 
Vn= E [ Vn] = 20 
20 0.5 
Equity 0 0.5 
VE= E [VE]= 20 
40 0.5 
Table VIII. 3 Outcomes of risky Project JI 
Value at the end Probability :. E [ V] 
of the period 
Firm as a whole 10 0.5 
VF= E [VF]= 40 
70 0.5 
Debt 10 0.5 
Vn= E[Vn]=15 
20 0.5 
Equity 0 0.5 
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The shareholders clearly prefer Project II which has results in a expected value of 25, 
five units more than Project I. Even though Project II results in the same expected 
value to the firm as a whole, the debtholders prefer Project I as the expected outcome 
of 20 renders their debt risk free (equal to the face value of 20). If Project II is 
undertaken, there is a 50% possibility that the value of the firm at the end of the period 
will be 10. If this is the case, not all the debt can be repaid. The shareholders' choice of 
a risky rather than a safe project demonstrates the 'distortion of investment' problem. 
B.2. The underinvestment problem 
The underinvestment problem suggests that shareholders will not undertake 
positive net present value projects if the benefits accrue to the debtholders. Consider a 
similar scenario to the 'distortion of investment' example above. 
Table VIII.4 Outcomes of Project III 
Value at the end Probability :. E [ V] 
of the period 
Firm as a whole 10 0.5 
VF= E [VF]= 47 
84 0.5 
Debt 10 0.5 
Vn= E[Vn]=15 
20 0.5 
Equity 0 0.5 
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Table VIIl.5 Outcomes of Project IV 
Value at the end Probability :. E [ V] 
of the period 
Firm as a whole 20 0.5 
VF= E [VF]= 50 
80 0.5 
Debt 20 0.5 
Vo= E [Vo]= 20 
20 0.5 
Equity 0 0.5 
VE= E[VE]=30 
60 0.5 
Shareholders prefer Project III as the expected value of 32 units is greater than 30. 
However, the firm as a whole would be better off if project IV was undertaken ( 50 
units versus 47 units). All the additional benefits of Project IV accrue to the 
debtholders and their preference is clearly Project IV as the debt is risk-free. The 
expected value of 20 covers the face value of the debt (20). The fact that the 
shareholders prefer the project with the lower expected value illustrates the 
underinvestment problem. 
B.3. Reduction of borrowing costs 
The distortion of investment and the underinvestment problems illustrate 
circumstances which could be and often are addressed through the introduction of 
bond covenants. However, the use of bond covenants impose indirect borrowing costs 
by prescribing non-optimal shareholder behaviour. If the firm manages its risk such 
that all risky debt is hedged, these indirect costs can be minimised and therefore 
borrowing costs, as a whole, reduced. Debtholders are aware of how shareholders will 










T. Dunley-Owen The Determinants a/Corporate Risk .\lanagement 69 
and will undertake projects that are 'sub-optimal' from the debtholders' perspective. 
The price charged is greater than the cost of risk-free debt3 to compensate for this 
suboptimal behaviour. If shareholders undertake to manage the risk in such a way that 
the payoff the debtholders would receive under their optimal scenario is guaranteed4, 
lower interest rates can be charged. Borrowing costs can be reduced by employing risk 
management to guarantee the optimal scenario. 
B.4. Reduction of expected costs of financial distress: Smith and Stultz (1985) 
Smith and Stultz ( 1985) show that by reducing the variability of the future 
value of the firm, risk management lowers the expected cost of bankruptcy. The 
magnitude of the reduction is a function of the probability of the firm encountering 
financial distress if it does not hedge and the costs the firm incurs if it does experience 
financial distress. Bankruptcy costs which need to be considered comprise not only the 
payments to third parties (the transaction costs of bankruptcy) but also the cost of the 
deterioration of valuable relationships with employees, buyers and suppliers who value 
long term alliances with the firm. 5 Reducing the likelihood of costly financial distress 
by reducing the variance of a firm's cash flows through risk management, increases the 
expected value of the firm, and thus lowers the expected costs of financial distress. 
i. The model 
The model begins by assuming the difference between a levered and unlevered 
firm to be the present value of bankruptcy costs (a negative difference) and the present 
3The debt does not necessarily have to be risk-free. The same argument would apply to less risky debt. 










T Dunley-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk Management 70 
value of the tax shield from interest payments (a positive difference). The value of the 
levered firm will increase for a given decrease in the present value of the expected 
bankruptcy costs. The decrease in expected bankruptcy costs can be brought about by 
reducing the variability of the future value of the firm. The firm faces two states of the 
world: bankruptcy and solvency. The firm is assumed to hold a self financing hedge 
portfolio6 which is constructed such that the payoff when bankrupt (without risk 
management) is positive. The sum of the payoff under each state and the value of the 
firm in that state, is greater than the face value of the debt. When a state of bankruptcy 
is assumed the face value of the debt is greater than the unhedged value of the firm. 
The payoff of the portfolio of the hedged firm is positive (assumed above). Thus the 
expected bankruptcy costs are lowered because the combined value of the firm and the 
payoff is greater than the value of the firm alone, and the expected value of the tax 
shield of debt is increased for the same reason. The value of the hedged firm is thus 
higher than the value of the unhedged firm. Risk management adds value by lowering 
the probability of incurring bankruptcy costs and increasing the value of the tax shield 
afforded by debt. 
This theory requires the no transaction costs assumption (A.3.) to be lifted 
because third party bankruptcy payments exist in the model. The assumption of 
. costless risk management is retained. The fixed investment schedule (A.9.) assumption 
is also lifted as the stream of operating cash flows is altered by bankruptcy costs. 
5 See Shapiro and Titman (1986) for a discussion hereof. 
6 A self-financing portfolio implies that the sum of the payoffs of the portfolio given the probability of 
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B.5. Size Implications 7 
The effect of firm size on the incentive for risk management is indeterminate. 
Assuming that risk management costs are proportional, Warner ( 1977) finds that direct 
bankruptcy costs are less than proportional to firm size. Smith and Stultz ( 1985) 
extend this and conclude that the reduction in expected bankruptcy costs is greater for 
the smaller firm. For this reason, smaller firms are more likely to undertake risk 
management. Furthermore, Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1996) contend that if 
information asymmetries exist, the relationship between firm size and risk management 
is negative (see Section VI.B.). 
A positive relationship is expected in the following circumstances. Nance, 
Smith, and Smithson ( 1993) claim that larger firms are more likely to employ people 
skilled in the management of risk, and that hedging programmes exhibit informational 
scale economies. Thus it is more likely that firms employing these risk managers (the 
larger firms) will hedge. This is supported when the assumption of no transaction costs 
is relaxed. The economies of scale generated by the larger firm's risk management 
programmes will encourage hedging. 
B.6. Empirical findings 
Nance, Smith, and Smithson investigate the relationship between the likelihood 
of firms utilising derivatives and firm size and leverage. Leverage is measured by a 
debt-size ratio and by an interest cover ratio. The results of the comparison of means 
suggest a significant positive relationship between hedging and firm size. No significant 
7 
Strictly speaking, size is an endogenous variable. It is a function of scale economies in the 
organisation and production. However, given the limited understanding of the determinants of size, 
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difference was found with respect to leverage. The logit analysis provides similar 
findings. 
The results of the logit analysis in Geczy, Minton, and Schrand ( 1996) show 
that the greater the probability of financial distress the more likely firms are to utilise 
derivatives. The interest coverage ratio and the long term debt ratio are employed as 
measures of borrowing capacity and indicators of financial distress. The lower a firm's 
interest coverage ratio and the higher its long term debt ratio, the more likely firms are 
to use derivatives. 
The univariate results are mixed. The long-term debt ratios of users of currency 
derivatives are statistically lower than those of non-users. The interest coverage ratios 
of the two groups are not statistically different. 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996) study three proxies for the expected costs of 
financial distress: firm size, interest cover and leverage. The univariate results indicate 
that firms with derivatives are significantly larger and have a higher degree of leverage. 
The interest cover of these firms is lower but this result is not significant. The tobit 
results give strong support for the theory that firms use derivatives to reduce the 
expected costs of financial distress. 
The likelihood of financial distress is measured by cash costs and leverage in 
Tufano' s ( 1996b) research. Cash costs include all direct and indirect costs of mining 
and related activities excluding non-cash items such as interest and extraordinary 
expenses. Leverage is long term debt scaled by firm size. The hypothesised relationship 
between these two proxies and risk management is positive. 
Tufano finds no observable relationship between the extent of risk management 
and the likelihood of financial distress (cash costs). Some evidence of a positive 
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results indicate that the theory has little predictive power in the North American gold 
mining industry, it is suggested that the relevance to this industry is limited because the 
dead-weight costs of bankruptcy may be small. Tufano points out that mines own 
tangible assets that produce an unbranded commodity product with no after-sales 
service. 8 Additionally mines are able to exercise the real option9 to temporarily stop 
production if financial distress is a consequence of prevailing short term conditions. 
C. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The reduction of borrowing costs rationale can only be justified if the 
possibility of financial distress to the firm is real or the firm faces high costs of financial 
distress. Research into the Modigliani-Miller capital structure debate has suggested 
that bankruptcy costs are an immaterial fraction of a large firm's assets. 10 If this is the 
case, the value that risk management programmes can add is limited. Smith and Stultz 
(1985) acknowledge this potential shortcoming of the theory, however, they claim that 
small bankruptcy costs can be sufficient to induce larger firms to hedge if the reduction 
in expected bankruptcy costs exceeds the costs of risk management. 
The evaluation of potential financial distress is primarily based on accounting 
results as opposed to economic earnings. This is especially true for the evaluation of 
bond covenant provisions. Smith and Stultz (1985) point out that it is possible for a 
value-maximising firm to choose to reduce the variance of its accounting earnings, 
8 Shapiro and Titman ( 1986) discuss characteristics of firms with high costs of financial distress 
listing industry specific and firm specific factors. One of the firm specific factors mentioned is 
substantial organisational assets, specifically intangible assets or brand names. 
9 See Brady (1996: 24) for a further (unrelated) discussion of real options. 










T. Dunley-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk J1anagement 7./ 
even if this increases the variance of economic earnings. Although risk management 
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IX. RISK AVERSE PLAYERS 
Lifting the assumption of risk neutrality introduces the possibility of the players 
having a non-neutral risk profile i.e. they are risk inclined or risk averse. The following 
models assume risk aversity. 
A. RISK AVERSE MANAGERS 
Smith (1984) and Smith and Stultz ( 1985) present models which suggest that a 
firms' corporate risk management activities might be linked to the risk aversion of 
corporate managers. 
A.1. Lifetime utility maximisation: Stultz (1984) 
Stultz assumes that principal-agent problems exist, i.e. assumption A. 7. is 
relaxed. Managers consequently maximise their expected lifetime utility which includes 
pecuniary remuneration as well as perceptions of earnings stability and job security. 
Shareholders recognise that managers will act in their own best interests. As a result, 
shareholders structure managers' compensation packages such that managers' income 
is an increasing function of the changes in the value of the firm. This structure realigns 
shareholders' and managers' objectives, however, it also results in agency costs being 
incurred. Agency costs are an inevitable consequence of any agency relationship. 1 
Managers actions are thus determined by their expected lifetime utility given their 
compensation contract, including perquisites and fringe benefits; and their expectations 
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of the actions shareholders or other potential investors can take to decrease their 
expected utility. 
Shareholders are able to eliminate non-systematic risk through diversification. 
This effectively renders them indifferent to the risk management activities of the firm 
(Froot, Scharfstein and Stein: 1993). However, other stakeholders in the firm may be 
significantly exposed to the corporation, and may be unable to diversify away this 
exposure. This is especially true for managers who have a large proportion of their 
personal wealth invested in the firm. This includes income which is derived from the 
firm, share option plans, equity stakes, and human capital. 
The managers' expected utility depends in part on the distribution of the firms' 
payoffs. Risk management changes the distribution of the firms' payoffs and, therefore, 
influences the managers' expected utility. Given their risk aversity, managers will 
prefer to reduce the risk to which they are exposed. If the variance of firm value is 
reduced, managers can be made strictly better off without affecting shareholder wealth. 
Thus corporate risk management is justified on the basis of the risk aversity of 
managers. 
i. The model 
Stultz derives a model where a manager's income is linked to the value of the 
firm. The firm has to make a payment in foreign currency in the future and can buy 
foreign currency forward. The change in the value of the firm, and consequently in the 
value of the managers' wealth is dependant on the change in the exchange rate, the 
payoff from the forward exchange contracts purchased (less the cost of borrowing) 
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maximises his or her wealth subject to a budget constraint. The optimal level of risk 
management is thus derived. The risk management takes place at firm level as Stultz 
claims that the firm has a comparative advantage therein and can thus undertake it at a 
lower cost than managers can on their own account. Consequently Stultz predicts a 
positive relation between managerial wealth invested in the firm in the form of an 
equity stake and risk management. 
A.2. Smith and Stultz (1985) 
Smith and Stultz ( 1985) develop the above theory by focusing on the form of 
the investment which managers hold in the firm. 
i. The model 
The model is a two-period model that once again positively links a manager's 
wealth with the value of the firm. The firm holds a hedge portfolio and consequently 
the manager's utility is dependant upon the value of the firm and the value of the hedge 
portfolio at the end of the period. The optimal hedge portfolio is thus derived. Smith 
and Stultz enunciate three implications of their model. In all three cases the manager's 
expected utility is a concave function of his or her end-of-period wealth. If the majority 
of the manager's wealth comprises an equity stake in the firm (as opposed to holding 
options), the model suggests that the optimal risk management strategy is to hedge as 
completely as possible. Shares provide linear payoffs and consequently a managers' 
wealth is a concave function of the firms' value. The manager's expected income 
(which is a part of wealth) is maximised when the firm is completely hedged. This 
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If the manager's wealth is composed primarily of options to buy equity (as 
opposed to equity), their wealth would be a convex function of firm value as options 
result in income payoffs which are convex. This implies that a manager's expected 
value is highest is the firm does not hedge at all. The third case is a hybrid which 
suggests that some (as opposed to total or none) risk management is optimal. The 
comparative advantage in risk management that the firm allegedly enjoys means that 
the risk management activity occurs at the firm level. 
Smith and Stultz predict a positive relation between risk management and managerial 
wealth invested in the firm in the form of an equity stake; and a negative relationship 
between the level of managerial option holdings and risk management. 
For the theory to hold the transaction costs are zero assumption (A.3.) and the 
assumption of no principal-agent problems (A.7.) are relaxed. In addition, risk aversion 
changes the nature of managerial decisions and therefore the fixed investment schedule 
assumption (A.9.) has to be relaxed. 
A.3. Empirical findings 
Tufano ( 1996b) measures the officers' and directors' share ownership as the 
log of the value of common shares owned (excluding options) at the average annual 
share price. The hypothesised relationship between the officers' and directors' share 
ownership and the portfolio delta is positive. This is because the theories predict that 
firms whose managers hold greater equity stakes, as a fraction of their private wealth, 
are more inclined to manage gold price risk. The variable representing the officers' and 
directors' option holdings is the number of options outstanding which are held by 
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options might be less inclined to manage gold pnce risk, therefore a negative 
relationship between the officers' and directors' option holdings and the portfolio delta 
is assumed. 
Tufano' s results indicate that managerial risk aversion has an important 
influence on corporate risk management. Both of Smith and Stultz's predictions are 
supported. Firms whose managers own more stock options, manage less gold price 
risk. Those whose managers have more wealth invested in common stock manage 
more gold price risk. 
Berkman and Bradbury's (1996) findings are ambiguous. Managerial share 
ownership is proxied by the proportion of shares held by directors. The univariate non-
parametric test indicates that the proportion of shares held by directors is lower for 
companies that use derivatives, as opposed to those that do not. However, the tobit 
model results suggest that managers do employ derivatives if they hold an equity stake 
in the firm. 
The measure for managerial share ownership used by Geczy, Minton, and 
Schrand ( 1996) is managerial wealth. This is defined as the log of the market value of 
the common shares beneficially owned (excluding options) by officers and directors. 
Managerial ownership of options is the log of the market value of the shares obtainable 
by exercising outstanding options. Univariate tests suggest that users of derivatives are 
not statistically different from non-users with respect to managerial wealth. The results 
of the logit regression analysis show that neither managerial wealth nor managerial 
ownership of options is statistically significant. 
The variables chosen by Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1996) examme a 
different aspect from those used in Berkman and Bradbury's research. Managerial 
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issued shares as used by Berkman and Bradbury. Therefore, Geczy, et al's research 
does not examine the effective control that managers exert over the organisation. It 
does, however, gauge and therefore compare the absolute level of managerial wealth 
invested in firms. The figure for outstanding options includes only those that are 
exerciseable within 60 days of the year end. This is a limited and in many cases very 
small portion of the total number of outstanding managerial options. 
A.4. Criticism 
The objective of both models is to derive optimal hedging portfolios, given the 
risk aversion of managers. The more fundamental issue of whether the investor or the 
firm should undertake the risk management is not explicitly dealt with in the 
conceptual models. It is assumed that risk management will occur at a firm level 
because of the firms' alleged comparative advantage. 
There is an internal inconsistency in Smith's (1984) theory. The 'no transaction 
costs' assumption is employed to justify shareholder indifference as to the firms' risk 
management policies. This assumption is then discarded to account for managers' 
preference for conducting risk management at the firm level. This inconsistency can be 
illustrated by the following extracts from Smith (1984). 
As, by assumption, shareholders want managers to maximise the value of the 
firm, they do not care about managers' choice of (number of foreign currency 
forwards) as long as hedging is costless and the investment policy is not 
affected by hedging. (J 31) 
If the manager must pay some transaction costs when he or she 
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she will choose the cheapest way of hedging and hence will hedge through the 
firm rather than on his or her personal account. In general, it is realistic to 
assume the firm has a comparative advantage in trading bonds or forward 
contracts. (131-132) 
A similar problem arises in Smith and Stultz (1985). 
To simplify, we assume that ... the firm incurs no transaction costs when it 
purchases or sells financial assets. (399) 
The combination of transaction costs, economies of scale, and the 
large number of managers within any firm make this comparative advantage 
likely. If there is a single manager, scale economies can still induce the 
manager to hedge through the firm. (401) 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The models are designed to determine optimal risk management levels given 
managerial risk aversion. They assume that risk management occurs at a firm level. 
The empirical research does suggest that the relationships predicted by the model hold. 
However, these models are not strictly relevant to the conceptual debate which is 
whether risk management should take place on a company or investor level. In future, 
the models can be adapted to explicitly include transaction costs. This would address 
the issue of where risk management should take place. 
In his research into whether managerial motives influence firm risk reduction 
strategies, May ( 1995) employs the following proxies for CEO motives: years with the 
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the firm's recent performance. This research is discussed in the section on principal-
agent problems (Section VIII). It may be appropriate for future research to utilise 
these proxies to investigate whether there exists a relationship between them and the 
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X. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS 
OF CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT USING SOUTH 
AFRICAN DATA 
An empirical analysis of the determinants of corporate risk management using 
South African data is performed. The investigation is based on significant international 
empirical works that have been seminal in the development of this particular subject 
area within financial academia. The basis of the study is primarily Berkman and 
Bradbury (1996) and Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1996), however, where appropriate 
facets of the other two international papers have been incorporated. Furthermore, the 
peculiarities of the South African environment and accounting practices have 
necessitated certain adaptations and changes to the international research. This is the 
first research to investigate the motives for hedging in a South African context. The 
results of the research are presented in the following section. 
A. CONSTRUCTION OF THE SAMPLE 
The sample consists of firms that were listed in the Industrial Sector of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange on 15 December 1996. The industrial sector of the main 
board of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was chosen to ensure homogenous results. 
The conditions faced by the other sectors lead to fundamentally different financial 
disclosures. Predictions surmised from a sample consisting of firms from all the sectors 
of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange would probably be redundant. Mining companies 
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African mining industry. The disclosure of mining companies' results is therefore 
intrinsically different from other South African companies. Given the research that 
Tufano (1996) has performed on North American mining companies, it is suggested 
that South African gold mining firms be investigated as a separate industry in future 
research. The characteristics and derivatives use of firms in the financial sector are 
crucially different from corporations in the industrial sector. The financial sector was 
excluded from the sample. 
The development and venture capital markets were not included in the sample 
because of their more 'speculatory' nature. The listing requirements are more lenient 
than those of the main board of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Therefore smaller 
companies with a shorter or weaker financial history list on the development or venture 
capital boards. Additionally, these shares are generally very illiquid. 
This sample was further restricted by eliminating investment holding 
companies. The activities of each company were determined from the 'Nature of 
Business' entry in The Stock Exchange Handbook: July 96 - Dec 96 (Alexander and 
Oldert: 1996). Of the remaining firms, those whose results are not reported in South 
African Rand or a Rand equivalent 1 are eliminated. 
The final sample consists of 146 firms of which 115 (79%) firms hedged and 31 
(21 % ) did not hedge. The firms in the final sample come from a broad range of sectors. 
Most are from the electronics sector (21 ); the clothing sector ( 19); engineering sector 
(15); and building, beverages, food, and stores sectors (each 12). The data set was 
obtained from McGregor's Online Database (McGregor's Information Services (Pty) 
Ltd: 1996). This information was verified and, where necessary, supplemented by 
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appendix contains detailed definitions of the variables and data sources for each 
variable. The full sample is also included in the appendix. 
B. DEPENDANT VARIABLE 
The dependant variable in this research is whether South African firms manage 
risk as part of their financial operations. The ideal measure of risk management is the 
hedge ratio of the contracts used to manage risk (Berkman and Bradbury: 1996). 
Brealy and Myers ( 1991: GS) define the hedge ratio as the number of units of an asset 
that should be bought to hedge one unit of a liability. South African Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP), which governs the presentation of and 
disclosures required in companies' annual financial statements, currently requires 
minimal disclosure of derivatives usage. Indeed, the only GAAP statement requiring 
disclosure relating to derivative instruments is AC112 'Changes in Foreign Currency 
Exchange Rates'. This statement specifies that the premium or discount that arises 
because a forward exchange contract has been used to cover a transaction, be 
disclosed. It is therefore necessary for a firm to acknowledge that they are using 
derivative instruments to hedge their foreign exchange exposures. The dependant 
variable is thus defined as 1 (one) if there is evidence of the translation of foreign 
assets, liabilities or transactions at a forward rate in the notes to the financial 
statements. An example of a note to the financial statements which indicates risk 
management is: 
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Foreign currency note 
Assets and liabilities in foreign currencies are translated at rates of exchange 
ruling at the year end or at rates applicable in forward exchange contracts. 
When fluctuations in exchange rates have been hedged, the balances are 
adjusted to reflect the unrealised gain and loss on the hedge at the year end. 
Gains and losses arising from other currency related transactions during the 
year are included in the earnings. (Tongaat Hulett Ltd, 1996 Annual Financial 
Statements) (emphasis added) 
Alternatively: 
Foreign Exchange Cover 
The group adopts the policy of obtainingforward cover on all foreign exchange 
transactions. (Sterling Clothing Ltd, 1996 Annual Financial Statements) 
(emphasis added) 
Where no evidence of a note indicating hedging is found, the dependant variable is 0 
(zero). This occurs where either no foreign currency note is disclosed or the note 
specifies that spot rates are used for all translations. The following is an example of the 
latter. 
Translation of foreign currencies 
Trading transactions within the group in foreign currencies are translated at the 
rates of exchange ruling at the transaction date. Exchange differences are 
recognised in the results for the year. 
All assets and liabilities of foreign entity subsidiaries are translated at the 
closing rate. Income statement items are translated at an appropriate weighted 
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the foreign currency translation reserve. (Protea Furnishers: 1996 Annual 
Financial Statement) 
B.1. Advantage of the risk management variable 
One of the limitations of Berkman and Bradbury (1996) and Geczy, Minton, 
and Schrand' s (1996) research, is that the dependant variable as defined does not a 
priori limit the use of derivatives to hedging. This may result in a misspecified model. 2 
Defining the dependant variable in terms of AC 112 disclosures ensures that firms 
classified as managing risk are using derivatives for hedging and not speculatory 
purposes. The results obtained will therefore relate solely to risk management which 
uses derivatives for hedging purposes. 
B.2. Limitations of the risk management variable 
Generally, the higher the measurement scale of the data used for statistical 
analyses, the richer the information content of the results. Consequently, the binary 
nature of the dependant variable used in this research limits the informational content 
of the conclusions. Given that there is no other source of publicly available information 
on risk management undertaken by South African companies, the limitations of the 
binary nature of the dependant variable have to be accepted. International empirical 
studies, including Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993 ), and Geczy, Minton, and 











T Dunley-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk ,\fanagement 88 
Basing the dependant variable on AC 112 disclosures limits risk management to 
derivatives usage for foreign currency transactions. Yet, South African GAAP does 
not consider any other purpose for using derivatives. AC 112 disclosures are therefore 
the only publicly available information on a company's use of derivative instruments. 
This is the same limitation that is experienced in some of the international research. 
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand ( 1996) limit their definition of derivatives usage to those 
used in foreign currency transactions. 
AC 112 does not consider non-linear derivative instruments; for example, 
options. If firms follow the requirements of ACl 12 strictly, the effects of using options 
for hedging purposes would remain off balance sheet. However, one of the 
fundamental principles of GAAP is 'substance over form'. The substance of the use of 
options for hedging foreign currency transactions is the same as that of using futures. 
Thus it can be assumed that the use of options or other non-linear derivative 
instruments for the purpose of protecting the firm against movements in foreign 
currencies must be disclosed under ACl 12. 
Some companies may not include information on hedging foreign currency 
transactions in their financial statements as South African GAAP is currently not 
mandatory and legally binding. Moreover, the requirements for firms listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange are based on Schedule 4 of the Companies Act No 61 
of 1973, as amended. Disclosure of any information relating to transactions utilising 
derivatives is not required by this schedule. Additional disclosures are required by the 
JSE, however, derivatives transactions are not considered (KPMG Corporate Financial 
Services: 1997). Nevertheless, an audit report states that 'In our opinion these financial 
2 Geczy, Minton, and Schrand ( 1996) consider this weakness and conclude that, on average, the firms 
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statements fairly present the financial position of the company . . . in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting practice and in the manner required by the Companies 
Act.' (Appendix to AU321 (Revised) para .02.) Thus it is assumed that all companies 
using derivatives to hedge foreign transactions have disclosed this fact. 
C. INDEPENDANT VARIABLES 
The independent variables tested are categorised according to the hypotheses 
which are being tested. Three main postulates are considered: the shareholder-
debtholder conflict, capital market imperfections and the risk aversion of managers. 
The definitions, constructions and data sources for all variables are detailed in the 
appendix. 
C.1. Shareholder - Debtholder Conflict 
Three variables were used to test the validity of the shareholder-debtholder 
conflict hypothesis. Measures that proxy the probability of the firm expenencmg 
financial distress are the long term debt ratio, interest cover and firm size. 
FIRM SIZE 
The effect of firm size on risk management activities is complex. There are 
alternative arguments depending on which assumptions are relaxed. (Nance, Smith, 
and Smithson: 1993, and Geczy, Minton, and Schrand: 1996). An inverse relationship 
between firm size and bankruptcy costs suggests that small firms should undertake a 
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greater degree of risk management. This holds if there is a less than proportional 
relationship between bankruptcy costs and firm size (Warner 1977 and Smith and 
Stultz: 1985). In this instance, the reduction in expected bankruptcy costs is greater for 
the smaller firm. Smaller firms are therefore more likely to undertake risk management. 
If smaller firms face a greater degree of information asymmetries, theory suggests a 
negative relationship: larger firms should hedge less. (Geczy, Minton, and Schrand: 
1996) A positive relationship is expected in the following circumstances. Nance, 
Smith, and Smithson (1993) claim that larger firms are more likely to employ people 
skilled in the management of risk. Additionally, hedging programmes exhibit 
informational scale economies. Thus it is more likely that firms employing these risk 
managers (the larger firms) will hedge. This is supported when the assumption of no 
transaction costs is relaxed. The economies of scale generated by the larger firm's risk 
management programmes will encourage hedging. 
Firm size is determined by the natural logarithrn3 of the market value of the 
firm. The market value is determined by multiplying the share price at year end by the 
number of shares in issue at year end. 
INrEREST COVER 
Firms which have relatively high interest cover ratios face a lower probability 
of experiencing financial distress. Theory predicts that the relationship between interest 
cover and risk management is negative. Interest cover is defined as the log of income 
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before interest and tax divided by the interest expense. 4 (Berkman and Bradbury: 1996, 
and Geczy, Minton, and Schrand: 1996) 
LEVERAGE 
Financial theory predicts that firms with healthier (lower) debt ratios, are less 
likely to experience financial distress. There is a negative relationship between risk 
management and the debt ratio. The debt ratio used is termed 'leverage'. Leverage is 
measured as the book value of debt over the market value of the firm. (Berkman and 
Bradbury: 1996) 
C.2. Capital Market Imperfections 
Underinvestment costs are a direct consequence of capital market 
imperfections. A positive relationship between underinvestment costs and risk 
management activities is suggested. Underinvestment costs are dependant upon two 
factors: the investment activities that could potentially be disrupted if there are not 
sufficient internally generated funds and the availability of internally generated funds. 
i. Investment Opportunities 
The investment opportunities are proxied by the earnings price ratio and the 
book to market ratio. 
4 Following Berkman and Bradbury ( 1996 ), income before interest and tax is set equal to one ( l) if it 
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EARNINGS-PRICE RATIO 
The price-earnings ratio is a traditional indicator of the growth potential of a 
company: the higher the ratio, the higher the market's perception of that company's 
potential for growth. In this research the ratio is inverted to eliminate an outlier 
problem introduced by small earnings in relation to price (Berkman and Bradbury: 
1996). The hypothesised relationship between this ratio and the extent of risk 
management is negative. 
BOOK-TO-MAR.KET RATIO 
The market-to-book ratio has similar implications viz. a viz. the firm's growth 
potential to the price-earnings ratio. The inverse of the market-to-book relationship is 
utilised so that there is a positive relationship between all the investment opportunity 
proxies and risk management. (Geczy, Minton, and Schrand: 1996, Berkman and 
Bradbury: 1996) 
CAPITAL lNvESTMENT RATIO 
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1996) introduce this ratio which investigates the 
intensity of capital investment. It is defined as the ratio of property, plant and 
equipment5 at year end to firm size. 
5 Property, plant and equipment is the recently introduced term for what has traditionally been 
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ii. Availability of Internally Generated Funds 
The availability of internally generated funds is proxied by the quick ratio and 
the short term asset growth ratio. 
QUICK RATIO 
The quick ratio is an indicator of liquidity. Theory suggests that the level of 
risk management increases as firms face tighter liquidity positions (a negative 
relationship). The quick ratio is defined as the ratio of current assets less inventory to 
current liabilities. (Berkman and Bradbury: 1996, and Geczy, Minton, and Schrand: 
1996) This ratio is a more stringent indicator of short term liquidity than the liquidity 
ratio utilised by Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993). 
ASSET GROWlH RATIO 
The proxy introduced by Berkman and Bradbury (1996) to determine a firm's 
ability to generate enough cash to finance current investment programmes is the asset 
growth ratio. This short term measure is the log of current year's change in tangible 
net assets plus depreciation divided by net income plus depreciation. 6 
6 If the denominator (the change in fixed assets plus depreciation) is negative, it is set equal to 
0.00001. If the numerator (net income plus depreciation) is negative. it is set equal to one. (Berkman 
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C.3. Risk A version of Managers 
Financial theory suggests that, given risk adversity, the greater the proportion 
of a manager's total wealth that is held in the firm, the greater the extent of risk 
management undertaken by that manager. 
DIRECTORS' SHARE OWNERSHIP 
The total level of managers' wealth (including income from sources outside the 
firm) is not publicly available. Therefore, the proxy that is used is the log of the market 
value of ordinary shares that managers had a beneficial interest in, directly or 
indirectly, at the balance sheet date. (Geczy, Minton, and Schrand: 1996, Tufano: 
19967) This is not entirely representative as it assumes a constant level of wealth 
across all managers in all firms and that the size of the management team is constant. 
The hypothesised relationship between managerial share ownership and risk 
management is positive. Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1996) also consider the 
relationship between managers' unexercised options holdings and hedging. South 
African Generally Accepted Accounting Practice does not require the disclosure of the 
options held by directors, thus this variable cannot be empirically tested. 
D. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
The statistical significance of a result is an estimated measure of the degree to 
which the result is representative of the population. The measure of statistical 
significance used in this research is the p-value. This term was introduced by K 
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Brownlee in 19608. The p-value represents the probability of error associated with 
rejecting the hypothesis of no difference between the two groups in the population 
when, in fact, the hypothesis is true. In other words, the p-value is the probability of 
obtaining a value of the test statistic as extreme or more extreme (in the appropriate 
direction) than that actually obtained given that the tested null hypothesis is true. It is 
also the smallest level of significance at which Ho can be rejected. (Daniel: 1995) The 
advantage of reporting a p-value is that the reader can set their own criteria for 
accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis. The reader is thus able to make an 
independent decision as to the significance of the results. The amount of the p-value 
represents a decreasing index of the reliability of a result. The higher the p-value, the 
less reliance can be placed on the observed relation between variables in the sample 
being representative of the relationship between the respective variables in the 
population. For example, a p-value of0.05 (this equates to 1 out of every 20) indicates 
that there is a 5% probability that the relation found between the variables in the 
sample is merely a coincidence. A p-value of 0.05 is generally regarded as the largest 
acceptable error level. Statistically significant results have p-values of less than 0. 01. P-
values ofless than 0.005 or 0.001 represent highly significant results. 
Differences between the means of the firms that used derivatives and those that 
did not, are tested for significance using the Mann Whitney U-test. This is a non-
parametric test which assumes that the dependant variable is measured on at least an 
ordinal scale. The interpretation of the test is essentially identical to the interpretation 
of the results of at-test for independent samples, except that the U-test is computed 
8 
Brownlee K. A ( 1960). Statistical Theory and Methodology in Science and Engineering, New 
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based on rank sums rather than on means. The U-test is the most powerful non-
parametric alternative to the t-test for independent samples. (Statsoft: 1996) 
E. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
When attempting to establish determinants of corporate risk management 
analytically, certain fundamental statistical problems are raised by the qualitative nature 
of the dependant variable. Ordinary least squares regression cannot be used as the 
assumption ofhomoskedasticity is violated by the estimation of the dependant variable. 
This estimation necessitates the use of a dummy binary variable, which in this research 
is whether the firms use derivatives to manage risk ( l) or not (0). Until recently a 
number of disparate techniques were needed to model a binary dependant variable as a 
function of a set of explanatory variables. These techniques ranged from the repetitious 
elaboration of two-way cross tabulations at fixed levels of the other predictors, to 
ordinary least squares regression or discriminate analysis for a binary dependant 
variable, to discriminate analysis for a polytomous dependant variable with continuous 
predictors, to non-parametric techniques for the case in which the dependant variable 
was ordinal. (Demaris: 1992). The multivariate analysis of categorical data has been 
transformed by a particular form of the general loglinear model, namely logit analysis. 
The above is illustrated by a quotation by Michael S Lewis-Beck in Demaris (1992: 
iii): 
'Logit modelling represents a breakthrough in the methodology of social 
science research because it offers ways to more efficient estimation of models 
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E.1. Logit Analysis 
Logit analysis transforms the problem of predicting probabilities within a (0, 1) 
interval to the problem of predicting the odds of an event occurring within the range of 
a real line. The logit model is based on the cumulative logistic probability function. Z; 
and is assumed to be a theoretical continuous index which is determined by the 
explanatory variable X. Thus 
Z;= a+ pX; 
Individual Z, cannot be observed. The only available data is whether observations fall 
into one category (high values of Z;) or a second category (low values of Z;). Logit 
analysis solves the problem of how to obtain estimates for the parameters of a and p 
while at the same time obtaining information about the underlying index Z. The 
derivation is taken from Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991: 258 - 259; 280 - 281). They 
specify the logit model as: 
where 
P; = F (ZJ = F (a + PXJ = --'1,____ 
1 . -Z1 +e 
e =base of natural logarithms z2.718 
1 
1 + e-(a + fJXi) 
(Eq. XI. I) 
P1= probability that an individual will make a certain choice given X; 
Multiplying both sides of this equation by 1 + e-z;, the following is obtained: 
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Taking the natural logarithm of both sides: 
Z, = log !!_1-'-
1 -P, 
Thus Eq. XI. 1 can be estimated by: 




This is the ' lo git' itself. It can be interpreted as the natural logarithm of the odds or 
the 'log odds'. This indicates the relative probability of falling into one of the two 
categories being investigated. 
Least squares estimation cannot be used to estimate the parameters of the 
model when the dependant variable is binary and the explanatory variables are 
continuous. Therefore it is necessary to estimate a logit model in which only one 
choice is associated with each set of independent variables (Pindyck and Rubinfeld: 
1991 ). This is achieved by using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. The 
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Pi= _1_. 
(Eq. XI.3) 
Individual Pi are not observed, the only available information is which of the binary 
choices ( Y, = 0 or Y, = 1) was made. The objective is to find parameter estimates for a 
and 13 which make it most likely that the choices in the sample would have occurred. 
Assuming that 1 is chosen n1 times and 0 n2 times (n1 +n2 = N) and that the data is 
arranged such that the first n 1 observations relate to 1, then the likelihood function has 
the form: 
L =Prob (Yi, ... , YN) =Prob (Y1) ... Prob (f1V) 
The probability of 0 being chosen is equal to one minus the probability of 1 being 
chosen. If TI is used to represent the product of a number of factors, the likelihood 
function becomes: 
~ N N 
L =pl ... pol (1 - pol+ I) ... (1 - PN) = n Pi n (1- Pi)= n P,; (1- P, )(1-Y;) 
i=I i=nl+I i=I 
The latter expression follows because the observations have been ordered such that Yi 
equals 1 for the first n1 observations and 0 for the last n2 observations. The logarithm 
of Lis maximised by substituting the logistic probability function from Eq. Xl.3. The 
following is obtained (note there are two steps to the derivation). 
1 l+e-<a+PK;>_I 
1-P =I- =-----' 1 + e-(a+px;) 1 + e-(a+px;) 
e-(a+px;) 1 1 
= = =----1 + e-(a+px;) 1 + (1 I e-<a+px, >) 1 + ea+px; 
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The slope estimators of a/\ and J3/\ are obtained by differentiating log L with respect to 
a and J3, setting it equal to zero and solving the resultant equation. 
O(logL) = Ln iP, I oa - LN iP, I oa = 0 
ofl 1=1 p 1=n,+I 1- p 
f' l l 
o(log L) = "n iJP, I of3 _ "N iJP, I o/3 = O 
ofl ~l=l p ~1=n1~1 1- p 
f' l l 
(Eq. XI.4) 
If the analysis involved constant and multiple independent variables, a senes of 
simultaneous Eq. XI.4 would have to be solved for the unique values of the constant 
and all the coefficients. This procedure has been automated by a number of statistical 
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XI. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE DETERMINANTS 
OF CORPORATE RISK MANGEMENT IN SOUTH 
AFRICAN FIRMS 
The results of the empirical investigation into the determinants of corporate 
risk management using South African data are presented in this section. The 
methodology and discussion of variables used are considered in Section X. 
A. UNIVARIATE NON-PARAMETRIC RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics of the independent variables: the mean; standard 
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Table XI. I. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Hypothesis Variable Mean Standard Median Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
Financial Distress Interest Cover 2.179 3.505 1.660 -11.243 12.990 
Finn Size 19.377 1.914 19.430 14.557 24.343 
Leverage 0.185 0.568 0.053 0.000 4.900 
Investment Earnings-price ratio 0.094 0.148 0.082 -0.651 1.163 
Opportunities 
Book-to-market ratio 1.026 l.116 0.695 0.092 6.685 
Capital investment 0.522 0.651 0.319 0.000 4.391 
Availability of Internal Quick Ratio l.405 4.030 0.935 0.212 49.255 
!Funds 
Asset Growth -0.617 3.370 -0.445 -11.513 12.106 
Risk Aversion Directors' share 13.570 7.318 15.834 -9.210 21.190 
ownership 
Table XI. I. shows selected summary statistics for the managerial and financial 
characteristics of all the firms included in the study. The sample contains 146 firms listed on the 
industrial sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1996. 
Firm size is measured by the log of the market value of the corporation on balance sheet date. 
Interest cover is denoted by the log of earnings before interest and tax divided by the interest expense. 
The debt ratio, defined as the book value of debt over the market value of the firm. measures the 
degree of leverage. Outlier problems that arise because firm's have small earnings are avoided by the 
inversion of the price earnings ratio. The book to market ratio is the inverse of the standard market to 
book ratio. Capital investment is defined as the ratio of property, plant and equipment divided by finn 
size. Liquidity is measured by the quick ratio: current assets less inventory over current liabilities. 
Asset growth is the log of the current year's change in fixed assets plus depreciation divided by net 
income plus depreciation. Directors' share ownership is the log of the market value of ordinary shares 
held, directly and indirectly, by the company's directors. 
To test the significance of the differences in the medians between firms that manage 
risk and those that do not, a Mann Whitney U-test was performed. 1 Table XI.2 reports 
the means and medians for the firms that hedge and those that do not. The results of 
the Mann Whitney U-test are also summarised in Table XI.2. 
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Table XI. 2. Univariate Non-Parametric Tests 
Firms which do not Firms which do hedge 
hedge 
N=3l N=ll5 
Hypothesis Variable Mean Median Mean Median Z- p-
statistic value 
Financial Distress Interest Cover l.344 1.254 2.403 1.866 -2.472 0.013 
Firm Size 18.273 18.435 19.674 19.693 -3.357 0.001 
Leverage 0.341 0.076 0.143 0.039 2.007 0.045 
Investment Earnings-price 0.098 0.082 0.093 0.082 -0.273 0.785 
Opportunities ratio 
Book-to-market 1.228 0.727 0.971 0.675 0.916 0.359 
ratio 
Capital investment 0.567 0.414 0.510 0.281 1.299 0.194 
Availability of Quick Ratio 2.721 0.942 1.050 0.930 0.462 0.644 
Internal Funds 
Asset Gro\\'th -0.914 -0.391 -0.536 -0.445 0.170 0.865 
Risk Aversion Directors' share 11.322 15.328 14.176 15.840 0.847 0.397 
ownership 
Table XI.2. shows selected summary statistics for the managerial and financial 
characteristics of the firms which manage risk and those that do not. Of the total of 146 firms 
included in the sample, 115 hedged and 31 did not. The Z-statistic is the result of the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney U-test. This technique assesses the differences in the medians between the group of 
firms that hedge and those that do not. The related p-values are listed adjacent to the Z-statistics. 
Firm size is measured by the log of the market value of the corporation on balance sheet date. 
Interest cover is denoted by the log of earnings before interest and tax divided by the interest expense. 
The debt ratio, defined as the book value of debt over the market value of the firm, measures the 
degree of leverage. Outlier problems that arise because firm's have small earnings are avoided by the 
inversion of the price earnings ratio. The book to market ratio is the inverse of the standard market to 
book ratio. Capital investment is defined as the ratio of property, plant and equipment divided by firm 
size. Liquidity is measured by the quick ratio: current assets less inventory over current liabilities. 
Asset growth is the log of the current year's change in fixed assets plus depreciation divided by net 
income plus depreciation. Directors' share ownership is the log of the market value of ordinary shares 
held, directly and indirectly, by the company's directors. 
Table XI.2 indicates strong support for theories which predict a greater degree 
of risk management in companies facing financial distress. A firm is more likely to face 
bankruptcy costs if it has a lower interest cover (p-value is 0.013) and is more highly 
levered (p-value is 0.045). Although the leverage result is not significant, it does fall 
within the largest acceptable error level. Theory predicts that firms in this position 
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The most significant finding is a negative relationship between firm size and 
hedging (p-value is 0.001). This is highly significant and therefore interesting given the 
conflicting hypotheses about firm size. The relationship between bankruptcy cost and 
firm size suggested by Warner (1977) and Smith and Stultz ( 1985) is supported by the 
above result. Their model predicts that the reduction in expected bankruptcy costs, due 
to hedging, is greater for the small firm given that bankruptcy costs are less than 
proportional to firm size. Thus smaller firms are more likely to hedge. Geczy, Minton, 
and Schrand (1996) suggest that if information asymmetries exist, the relationship 
between firm size and risk management is negative. This theory is support by the 
significant negative relationship found. However, the result is contrary to the postulate 
that larger firms are more likely to hedge because they experience economies of scale 
and informational economies when managing risk. 
Firms which hedge have a higher capital investment ratio (p-value is 0.194). 
Although this is the most significant result among the variables testing the investment 
opportunities hypothesis, it is not statistically significant. The earnings-price ratios of 
firms employing derivatives is higher than firms who do not but, with a p-value of 
0.785, the relationship is not significant. An insignificant negative relationship, with a 
p-value of 0.359, between the book-to-market ratio and risk management is found: this 
is contrary to financial theory. 
Neither the availability of internal funds nor the directors' share ownership are 
found to be notable explanatory variables. 
Correlation is a measure of the relation between two or more variables. The 
terminology and concepts of correlation were introduced by Galton in 1888. The 
correlation coefficient measures the strength of the linear relationship between two or 
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Correlation coefficients can range from -1. 00 to + 1. 00. The value of -1. 00 represents a 
perfect negative correlation while a value of + 1. 00 represents a perfect positive 
correlation. A value of 0.00 represents a lack of correlation. The significance of a 
correlation coefficient will change depending on the size of the sample from which it 
w(ls computed. The most widely-used type of correlation coefficient is Pearson's r 2 
which is also called linear or product-moment correlation. 
Of the 45 Pearson correlation coefficients reported in Table XI.3., 15 are 
statistically different from zero at p-value < 0.05. These are italicised in Table Xl.3. 
This suggests that multicollinearity is present in the data. Given these correlations 
among the different firm characterises, the univariate tests cannot be expected to reveal 
significant differences in firm traits, holding other attributes constant. The smallest 
correlation is 0.00008 between the book-to-market and quick ratios. The largest is 
0.855 between the book to market ratio and the capital investment ratio. 
2 The original reference is Pearson K, ( 1896), Regression, heredity, and panmixia, Philosophical 
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Table XI. 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix Independent ·variables 
Interest Firm Lever Earning- Book-to- Asset Capital Quick Directors' 
Cover Size age price Market Growth Ratio Ratio share 
Ratio Ratio Ratio ownership 
Interest Cover 1.000 
Firm Size 0.156 1.000 
Leverage -0.149 -0.246 1.000 
Earnings-price 0.340 -0.107 0.137 1.000 
Ratio 
Book-to-Market -0.058 -0.390 0.701 0.504 1.000 
Ratio 
Asset Growth -0.218 0.066 -0.115 -0.081 -0.107 1.000 
Ratio 
Capital Ratio -0.038 -0.244 0.451 0.504 0.855 0.107 1.000 
Quick Ratio 0.077 -0.170 -0.033 -0.030 0.000 -0.292 -0.090 1.000 
Directors' share -0.118 0.036 0.054 -0.017 0.059 0.068 0.062 -0.263 1.000 
ownership 
Table Xl.3. lists the Pearson correlation coefficients for explanatory variables used in the 
Mann Whitney U-test and the logit analysis. The italicised correlation coefficients are significant at p 
<0.05. 
Firm size is measured by the log of the market value of the corporation on balance sheet date. 
Interest cover is denoted by the log of earnings before interest and tax divided by the interest expense. 
The debt ratio. defined as the book value of debt over the market value of the firm, measures the 
degree of leverage. Outlier problems that arise because firm's have small earnings are avoided by the 
inversion of the price earnings ratio. The book to market ratio is the inverse of the standard market to 
book ratio. Capital investment is defined as the ratio of property, plant and equipment divided by firm 
size. Liquidity is measured by the quick ratio: current assets less inventory over current liabilities. 
Asset growth is the log of the current year's change in fixed assets plus depreciation divided by net 
income plus depreciation. Directors' share ownership is the log of the market value of ordinary shares 
held, directly and indirectly, by the company's directors. 
Statistically significant results in the univariate analysis of means are only found 
for variables testing the financial distress hypotheses. These results suggest that firms 
who hedge have a lower interest cover ratio, are smaller and are leveraged to a greater 










T. Dun/ey-Owen The Determinants of Corporate Risk J4anagement 107 
B. RESULTS OF THE LOGIT ANALYSIS 
Logit regress10n analysis is a statistical technique which facilitates the 
multivariate analysis of categorical data3 . The overall chi2 value for the analysis (with 9 
degrees of freedom) is 24.292. With a p-value4 of 0.00387, this is a highly significant 
result and suggests that risk management practices in South African firms are 
associated with the firm and managerial characteristics tested. 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the logit regression are reported in Table 
XI.4. The predicted sign registers the direction of the relationship which is suggested 
by financial theory. The sign of the coefficient estimate indicates whether the 
relationship between the variables is found to be positive or negative. The p-value is a 
measure of statistical significance of the value of the coefficient estimate. The p-value 
is derived from the relevant t-statistic with 136 degrees of freedom. The t-statistic and 
standard error are not central to understanding the results of the analysis and have been 
included for interest. 
3 The logit regression model is discussed and derived in Section X.E. 
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Table XI . ./. Logit Estimates of the Determinants of the Corporate Use of Derivatives 
Hypothesis Variable Predicted Coefficient p -
Constant 











































Logit regression estimates of the relationship between the likelihood of a firm which manage 
risk and the variables listed below are shown in Table XI.4. The p-value, t-statistic and standard error 
associated with each estimate are included. 
Firm size is measured by the log of the market value of the corporation on balance sheet date. 
Interest cover is denoted by the log of earnings before interest and tax divided by the interest expense. 
The debt ratio, defined as the book value of debt over the market value of the firm, measures the 
degree of leverage. Outlier problems that arise because firm's have small earnings are avoided by the 
inversion of the price earnings ratio. The book to market ratio is the inverse of the standard market to 
book ratio. Capital investment is defined as the ratio of property, plant and equipment divided by firm 
size. Liquidity is measured by the quick ratio: current assets less inventory over current liabilities. 
Asset growth is the log of the current year's change in fixed assets plus depreciation divided by net 
income plus depreciation. Directors' share ownership is the log of the market value of ordinary shares 
held. directly and indirectly, by the company's directors. 
The logit analysis yields two significant results: larger firms are more likely to 
undertake risk management, and the likelihood of a firm hedging increases with the 
size of the directors' ownership therein. 
As with the univariate study, the variables concerned with the hypothesis of 
financial distress are found to be the most significant. However, these results are 
unexpected. The proposed positive relationship between risk management and leverage 
is not supported. Firms which manage risk are more likely to have a lower degree of 
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A similar discrepancy occurs with the interest cover ratio. Firms with higher interest 
cover ratios undertake risk management. However, the p-value is 0.117 and therefore, 
this relationship is not significant. Contrary to the results of the Mann Whitney U-test, 
a highly significant positive relationship (p-value of 0.002) between firm size and risk 
management, exists. Larger firms are more likely to undertake risk management. The 
theories which propose that larger firms experience scale and informational advantages 
in risk management and are thus more likely to hedge, are supported by this result. The 
literature which predicts a negative relationship because corporations attempt to lower 
the expected costs of bankruptcy through risk management, is not upheld by the 
findings of the logit analysis. The relationship between firm size and risk management 
is the most significant relationship found by the analysis. 
A statistically significant relationship exists between the directors' share 
ownership and risk management (p-value of 0.066). The larger the level of the 
directors' investment in a company, the more likely that firm is to hedge. When the 
assumption of no principal-agent problems is lifted, the possibility of the managers 
having a risk averse profile is introduced. Risk averse managers prefer to reduce the 
risk to which they are exposed. Managers who have a large proportion of their 
personal wealth invested in the firm and whose wealth is therefore affected by changes 
in the value of the firm, can achieve this by reducing the variance of the firm's returns. 
Corporate risk management is asserted on the basis of managers' risk aversion. The 
relationship predicted by the literature is supported by the results of the lo git analysis. 
None of investment opportunities variables yield statistically significant logit 
estimators. Although the hypothesised negative relationship of the earnings-price ratio 
with risk management holds (p-value of 0.33), the direction of the book-to-market 
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ratio is not significant. The availability of internally generated funds, as measured by 
the quick and asset growth ratios does not impact on firms' decision to manage risk. 
Neither result is statistically significant (the p-value relating to the quick ratio is 0.161 
and that relating to the asset growth ratio is 0.781). These results imply that the 
theories justifying risk management on the basis of costly external financing affecting 
investment activity are not strongly supported. 
The fact that only two statistically significant results are found is expected 
given that a number of the variables are correlated. The Pearson correlation 
coefficients are reported in Table XI.3. Of the 45 reported, 15 are statistically different 
from zero. This suggests that multicollinearity is present in the data. 
The logit analysis suggests that larger firms hedge and that the directors of the 
firms that hedge own a larger proportion of the company. These two variables are 
significant determinants of corporate risk management activities. The hypothesis that 
the costs of financial distress are reduced by risk management is not supported by the 
results of the logit analysis. The predictions of financial theory in respect of capital 
market imperfections are not representative of the characteristics of firms listed on the 
industrial sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
C. COMPARISON WITH INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A comparison of the results of the few empirical studies is useful as it highlights 
which hypotheses are supported by real world data. The studies are performed in 
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The most significant relationship in the research presented here, that firm size is 
positively related to hedging, is also found by Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) and 
Berkman and Bradbury ( 1996). Directors' share ownership, which tests the risk 
aversion hypothesis, is found to have a notable positive relationship with risk 
management in this study, as well as Berkman and Bradbury ( 1996) and Tufano 
(1996b). The theory, which posits that risk management is undertaken to reduce the 
costs of financial distress, is supported by the results of the univariate study in this 
research, Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1996) and Berkman and Bradbury (1996). The 
capital market imperfections hypothesis has found mixed support in the various 
studies. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) and Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1996) 
find that the research and development variable is significant. The quick variable is also 
noted in Geczy et al. Berkman and Bradbury (1996), however, observe a relationship 
between the earnings-price ratio and hedging. There is no evidence to substantiate the 
capital market imperfections theory in this study. Further research should be conducted 
into the risk aversity and scale advantages hypotheses as these have the most empirical 
support. 
Interestingly, the findings of this research and those of Berkman and Bradbury 
(1996) are similar. Firm size is the variable which yields the most significant result and 
in both cases it is positive with a p-value of 0.002. Directors' share ownership is 
significant just beyond the 10% level in Berkman and Bradbury and is significant in this 
research. Interest cover, which is significant in the New Zealand research is, however, 
not significant in South Africa. In both papers, the asset growth variable exhibits the 
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XIII. CONCLUSION 
This paper analysed the determinants of corporate risk management activity 
and presents exploratory research on this subject in a South African context. 
Traditional financial theory based on the Modigliani-Miller indifference paradigm 
suggests that under certain assumptions, a firm's financial policy is irrelevant, i.e. it has 
no impact on firm valuation. Corporate risk management, as a major aspect of overall 
financial policy, is therefore also irrelevant. However, this conclusion is contradicted 
by observation of company practices. The use of derivatives, particularly for hedging, 
is widespread. 
The apparent conflict between the predictions of financial theory and what is 
observed in practice has recently begun receiving attention from international financial 
researchers. A number of hypotheses which attempt to explain why risk management 
takes place at a corporate level have been presented. In order to evaluate the strength 
of the underlying theory, this paper began with a formalised process of identifying the 
assumptions underlying the various hypotheses. The assumptions discussed were those 
at the core of the indifference framework: all markets are perfectly competitive and 
efficient; information is perfect and costless; transactions costs are zero; no taxes exist; 
all individuals undertake maximising behaviour; the objective of the firm is to maximise 
shareholder value; no principal-agent problems exist; risk neutrality; and the firm faces 
a fixed investment schedule. 
The hypotheses which attempt to justify the relevance of corporate risk 
management were derived by relaxing one or more of these basic assumptions. The 
theories discussed in the existing literature were classified according to which 
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where corporate risk management may increase firm or shareholder value. These 
situations were created by capital market imperfections, informational asymmetries, 
convexity of the tax schedule, principal-agent problems, including shareholder-
manager and shareholder-debtholder conflicts, and risk averse participants. A limited 
number of empirical tests of these postulates have been performed. Four of the more 
significant international studies were discussed in the paper. The results are varied, and 
each shows support for different hypotheses. 
For the first time an empirical investigation into the determinants of corporate 
risk management in a South African context was conducted. The most important result 
of the univariate analysis indicated that companies undertake risk management to 
reduce the expected costs of financial distress. There was a highly significant negative 
relationship between firm size and risk management, suggesting that the reduction in 
expected bankruptcy costs, due to hedging, is greater for the small firm given that 
bankruptcy costs are less than proportional to firm size. An alternative hypothesis that 
is upheld by the result is that if information asymmetries exist, the relationship between 
firm size and risk management is negative. 
The logit regression analysis yielded a highly significant overall result, which 
suggests that risk management practices are related to company and managerial 
characteristics. Two variables, director's share ownership and firm size, were 
significant. Larger firms undertake more risk management. This result is consistent 
with the hypothesis that firms experience scale and informational advantages in risk 
management. The univariate analysis found contradictory evidence of a negative 
relationship between firm size and risk management. However, the logit regression is a 
more reliable indicator of the relationship between variables as it controls for the other 
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company, the more likely that firm is to hedge. Corporate risk management is asserted 
on the basis of managerial risk aversion. 
Given that the investigation into this subject is in its infancy, there are several 
areas for future research. Subsequent work might increase the power of the test by 
using a continuous measure of risk management activity. ED 107 'Financial 
instruments: Disclosure and Presentation' was released in September 1996. This 
statement requires the disclosure of information about the extent and nature of 
financial instruments utilised by a company. These disclosures are more onerous than 
ACl 12, and would facilitate the use of a 'fair value' variable such as that employed by 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996). The subject of information asymmetries is receiving 
increasing attention in the economic sciences. The theories developed should be 
investigated and, if relevant, adapted to increase the understanding of corporate risk 
management. 
An additional area for further research is the South African gold mmmg 
industry. An analysis similar to that performed by Tufano (1996b) could be conducted. 
Given the current disclosures made by the South African mining industry, it may not be 
possible to reconstruct Tufano's portfolio delta percentage. However, this may be 
possible in the future as the South African standards for disclosure are brought in line 
with international norms. 
Corporate risk management is likely to become increasingly prevalent as the 
sophistication of the tools to manage risk develop and the level of education about the 
subject grows. The reasons for hedging at a company level is an area that has only 
recently begun receiving attention from financial academics. Further research must be 
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... finance theory has had ... less clear cut guidance to offer on the logically 
prior question ~f hedging strategy: What sort of risks should be hedged? 
Should they be hedged partially or fully? ... It is not that there are no stories 
to explain why firms might wish to hedge . ... However, it seems fair to say that 
there is not yet a single, accepted framework which can be used to guide 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1. DATA SOURCE 
A. DEPENDANT VARIABLE 
Variable Data used to determine variable Source 
I (the firm hedges) or 0 (the firm does not hedge) Foreign Currency Note to Financial Statements AFS 
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Hypothesis Variable 
Financial Distress Interest Cover 
Firm Size 
Data description Data used to calculate 
variables 
Log of income before Operating income 
interest and tax divided Interest paid 
by the interest expense 
Log of the market value Number of shares 
of the firm Share price at year end 
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Hypothesis Variable 
Leverage 
Investment Earnings Price ratio 
Opportunities 
Book - Market ratio 
Capital investment 
Availability of Quick Ratio 
Internal Funds 
Data description Data used to calculate 
variables 
Book value of debt over Book value debt 
the market value of the 
firm. 
Inverse of the price 
earnings ratio 
Inverse of the market to 
book ratio 
Ratio of fixed assets to 
firm size 
Current assets less 
inventory divided by 
current liabilities 
Firm Size 
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Hypothesis 






AFS = Annual Financial Statements 
Data description 
Current years' change in 
fixed assets plus 
Data used to calculate 
variables 
Fixed assets - current year 
Fixed assets - prior year 
depreciation divided by Depreciation 
net income plus Net income 
depreciation 
Log of the market value # shares held by directors 
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APPENDIX 2. DATA 













































Manage- cover price '.\larket Growth ratio ratio 
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2.884 20.255 0.008 0.062 
-8.217 17.329 0.129 -0.651 
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Firm Risk Interest Firm size Leverage Earnings- Book-to- Asset Capital Quick 
Manage- cover price Market Growth ratio ratio 
ment ratio ratio 
138 1.094 19.451 0.005 0.015 0.818 -0.250 0.192 0.823 
139 1.584 20.199 0.013 0.120 1.220 -0.852 0.684 0.951 
140 1 2.072 20.456 0.035 0.065 0.351 -1.282 0.077 0.902 
141 0 0.650 15.624 4.900 0.230 6.259 -11.513 1.436 1.286 
142 0 1.254 19.626 0.065 0.073 0.455 -0.058 0.151 2.133 
143 2.025 17.464 0.246 0.136 0.582 -0.329 0.293 1.181 
144 0 1.378 17.702 0.099 0.115 0.509 -1.074 0.420 0.791 
145 0 5.194 17.034 0.087 0.160 0.955 -0.621 0.373 1.254 
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